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Abstract: 
States can choose to cooperate, delay or escalate their territorial disputes, but there is a lack of 
understanding of strategy behind each choice. In this study, Russian territorial disputes are looked at 
using the theory of omnibalancing and the theory of preventive warfare, theories which have already 
been applied by Taylor Fravel in his analysis of the Chinese territorial disputes. The results of this 
research show that Fravel’s approach can explain a slight majority of Russia’s cases, but the 
explanatory power could be increased by changing certain premises of his theory. 
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1 Introduction 
Territorial claims are always tied to notions of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
which are one of the most pressing geopolitical concerns of every state. However, there are many 
claims which are disputed between two or more states. Political experts are all aware of claims 
presented in cases which receive media highlights: Tibet, Taiwan, Kashmir, and Kosovo, to name a 
few. How states deal with their core principles perhaps best exemplifies their behaviour. By state 
actions or behaviour, I refer to a wide variation of behaviour among countries when it comes to 
territorial disputes, but they can all be grouped into three main categories: first, cooperative 
behaviour; second, coercive or escalatory behaviour and finally, status-quo behaviour. Distinction is 
not always clearly cut between these categories, but categorization serves a very important purpose. 
 Territorial disputes are important not only because they represent core concerns, but also 
because, in an international system composed of sovereign states, contested land has been the most 
common issue over which states collide and go to war.1 Paul Diehl found a close correlation between 
wars and territorial “proximity or contiguity.”2 Similarly, Lewis F. Richardson also found a close 
correlation between shared frontiers and external wars.3 This varied behaviour of many countries 
creates a puzzle that I seek to solve; namely, why do countries pursue compromise in some disputes 
but use force in others? After all, although the majority of wars occur between neighbours, most of 
the time neighbours keep their disputes under control. Even then one can observe borders as 
thermometers of tension between states.4 An answer to the puzzle will help us understand when 
states resort to force as a tool of statecraft, as well as when states choose to cooperate. I will utilize a 
causal model, seeking to identify the main reasons and factors. I have chosen to use Russia as a case 
study because it contains a rich history of territorial disputes, concessions and use of force. The 
answer to the question behind Russia’s rationale to cooperate or use force in a territorial dispute will 
help us illuminate the trajectory of Russia’s behaviour as a great power. It will give us an insight into 
Russian foreign policy and whether it resembles a realist and a rationalist approach. A “medium-n” 
research design will be used, which refers to a number of cases between two and one hundred. It 
strives to preserve most of the valuable assets of the case-oriented approach while maximizing the 
                                                          
1
 K.J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989, vol. 14 (Cambridge Univ Pr, 
1991); J. Vasquez and M.T. Henehan, "Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816-1992," Journal of 
Peace Research 38, no. 2 (2001); J.A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle, vol. 27 (Cambridge Univ Pr, 1993). 
2
 Paul F. Diehl, "Contiguity and Military Escalation in Major Power Rivalries, 1816–1980," The Journal of Politics 
47, no. 04 (1985): 1206. 
3
 Lewis F. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (New York: The Boxwood Press, 1960), 176-77. 
4
 C. Levinsson, "The Long Shadow of History: Post-Soviet Border Disputes—the Case of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Russia," (2006): 99. 
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explanatory power of the relevant theory by selecting additional cases.5 The first chapter will provide 
a literature review on this research question. The second chapter will outline theories of cooperation 
and escalation, as well as provide details about the research design. Chapter three will start with 
empirical evidence, namely the case of Kuril Islands. Subsequent chapters will deal with other 
disputes, in the following order: The Sino-Soviet border dispute, the territorial dispute between 
Russia and the Baltic States, the Ruso-Ukrainian dispute over the Tuzla Island, the Soviet Union’s 
dispute with Turkey and Iran, and finally, Russia and Kazakhstan’s border demarcation. I conclude by 
assessing the empirical results which confirm evidence for my hypotheses in the majority of episodes 
presented here. These results also show implications for assessing Russia’s future behaviour, which 
through the past evidence points towards greater likelihood that Russia will cooperate than use force 
in its territorial disputes. 
This research contributes to the social science, first of all, because territorial disputes are an 
important source of conflict that can result in violence. Yet research on territorial disputes’ impact on 
international relations has received little interest among international relations scholars because the 
majority of such conflicts tend to be localized.6 Yet the importance of territorial conflicts should not 
be minimized. After all, one reason why Hitler rose to power in Germany was due to the bitter 
feelings Germans felt for losing part of their territory to Poland. Also, Morris, in his study on the Kuril 
Islands, concluded that the reason why there has been no solution on the Kuril Island dispute is 
primarily because the international environment is not conducive to resolving the dispute. Neither 
side feels the pressure to cooperate.7 However, here we will gain a better understanding what a 
conducive international environment might look like, and why forceful seizure of land will likely see 
an escalation in conflict (depending on the internal and external dynamics of Russia). If the theories 
tested in this research prove to be applicable to Russia, then practitioners in the fields of 
international relations, politics, diplomacy and international business will be better equipped to 
understand the risks and opportunities that Russia, but also possibly other countries face. Finally, an 
indirect contribution of this research will be to understand whether Russia tends to be a more 
aggressive or a more cooperative power when it comes to dealing with its territorial disputes. 
 
 
                                                          
5
 D. Levi-Faur, "Comparative Research Designs in the Study of Regulation: How to Increase the Number of Cases 
without Compromising the Strengths of Case-Oriented Analysis," The Politics of Regulation (2004). 
6
 T. Forsberg, "Theories on Territorial Disputes," Contested Territory. Border Disputes at the Edge of the Former 
Soviet Empire. Studies in Communism in Transition (1995): 24. 
7
 Gregory L. Morris, "Japan, Russia and the Northern Territories Dispute: Neighbors in Search of a Good Fence," 
(DTIC Document, 2002), Kindle location 1540-50. 
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2 Literature Review 
Although there have been systematic studies dealing with questions such as why countries 
choose to cooperate, as well as use force in territorial disputes, Fravel’s case study on China is a 
breakthrough because it utilizes several previous overarching theories to explore qualitative depth of 
a single case. He confirms that “although research on China’s conflict behaviour highlights the role of 
territorial disputes, they have yet to be examined systematically.”8 From his understanding, previous 
studies through quantitative analysis have identified important empirical regularities in how states 
behave in these disputes. The following three factors linked with the settlement and escalations of 
territorial disputes have been the most featured. First, both democracies and alliance partners in a 
territorial conflict against each other are more likely to compromise and often settle their disputes, 
and less likely to initiate military confrontations, than nondemocratic or nonaligned states in such 
conflicts. Second, all types of states are more likely to use force and less likely to cooperate in 
disputes over land highly valued for its strategic importance, economic resources, or symbolic 
significance. Third, militarily stronger states are usually more likely to use force to achieve their 
territorial goals than weaker ones which lack the means to resist or coerce their opponents.9 
Building on the above findings, Fravel selects specific theories and approaches which deal 
with questions of territorial dispute in order to point out their weaknesses. One such theory is 
ideational theory by Tanisha Fazal, who identifies the emergence in the international system of a 
norm against territorial conquest from the 1920s; one that became entrenched after World War II.10 
She suggests that the presence of a norm against conquest makes states more likely to offer 
concessions because changing a territorial status quo through force is viewed as increasingly 
illegitimate and thus more costly. Fazal’s theory is very similar to the democratic peace theory, which 
also utilizes norms to explain cooperation in territorial disputes. It claims that democracies rarely, if 
                                                          
8
 M.T. Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes (Princeton 
Univ Pr, 2008), 4. 
9
 G. Chiozza and A. Choi, "Guess Who Did What," Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 3 (2003); G. Goertz and 
P.F. Diehl, Territorial Changes and International Conflict, vol. 5 (Psychology Press, 1992); P.R. Hensel, 
"Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816–1992," 
International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 1 (2001); P.R. Hensel and S.M.L. Mitchell, "Issue Indivisibility and 
Territorial Claims*," GeoJournal 64, no. 4 (2005); P.K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and 
International Conflict (Univ of Michigan Pr, 1998); P.K. Huth and T.L. Allee, The Democratic Peace and Territorial 
Conflict in the Twentieth Century, vol. 82 (Cambridge Univ Pr, 2002); A.M. Kacowicz, Peaceful Territorial Change 
(Univ of South Carolina Pr, 1994); R. Mandel, "Roots of the Modern Interstate Border Dispute," Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 24, no. 3 (1980). 
10
 T.M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton Univ 
Pr, 2007); M.W. Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force," 
International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001). 
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ever, go to war against each other, including over territory.11 Doyle claims that free states and partly-
free states account for 24-26% of international violence while non-free states account for 61%.12 
Democracies are thus assumed as more pacific and thus more likely to compromise in territorial 
disputes. Finally, liberals have also promoted theories of economic interdependence. 13 Their 
rationale is that states with high or growing levels of economic interdependence may be more likely 
to compromise in their disputes in order to increase trade or investment which is being jeopardized 
by the presence of a dispute.14 Some call this process a “capitalist peace”.15 This approach details 
conditions under which the use of force will decline.  
Fravel dismisses these arguments on the grounds that a consolidation of a norm against 
conquest fails to explain change in a state’s decisions once the norm becomes consolidated. Above 
theories also fail to explain why states would choose cooperation over delay, or especially why 
democracies/capitalist nations choose to cooperate or delay, or go to war with non-democracies. 
Interdependence can also be asymmetrical, and thus used as a leverage in bargaining. Thus, a state 
has motivations behind each decision, even if the state is heavily restrained. For these reasons 
theories of norms and economic interdependence are deemed inadequate to answer this research 
question. 
Like idealist and normative approaches above, realists have proposed their own explanations 
as most feasible. Theories of offensive realism and power transition16 argue that states should be 
most likely to use force when they can seize disputed land at an acceptable cost or impose a 
favourable settlement on their adversary. That is, states will expand when they possess the 
capabilities to do so at an acceptable cost. Thus, states in territorial disputes will exploit advantages 
in relative capabilities to realize their territorial claims. The problem with this theory is that it is 
illogical for states to use violent means when they have an upper hand in negotiations due to their 
military power. If they can expect to win without using force, why would they expend the military 
option?17 
However, there is also a defensive logic in using force, which is an approach utilizing a 
reputational logic. According to this logic, a state will use force in a territorial dispute not because of 
                                                          
11
 B.M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton Univ Pr, 1995). 
12
 M.W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," The American Political Science Review (1986): 1154. 
13
 B.A. Simmons, "Rules over Real Estate," Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 6 (2005). 
14
 Ibid., 844. 
15
 S.G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of 
Conflict (Princeton Univ Pr, 2007); E. Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace," American Journal of Political Science 51, 
no. 1 (2007). 
16
 A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (Knopf New York, 1968). 
17
 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes, 35. 
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the importance of the land being contested but because of the need to invest in a general reputation 
for toughness.18 Barbara Walters explains this logic by stating that a state with multiple territorial 
conflicts has a strong incentive to build a reputation for toughness in order to dissuade opponents in 
other territorial conflicts from demanding concessions or strengthening their relative power.19 There 
is a second logic to this - a state might use force in a territorial dispute, not to strengthen its position 
in the dispute, but to signal resolve (or coerce its opponent) over other interests.20 This implies 
looking at the broader dynamics of rivalry. The territorial dispute is then actually a proxy for the 
rivalry. According to Fravel, rivalry does distort his theoretical framework, so rivalry should be a 
conditional variable. Yet one should also expect a varied behaviour between rivals, from violence to 
status-quo, but sometimes even cooperation. Some applicability of Fravel’s theoretical framework 
should thus exist among rivals as well. 
Critiquing traditional realists’ focus on external factors, Christensen presents neo-classical 
realism’s logic of mobilization and diversion, which also deals with our research question. This logic 
examines domestic political incentives for escalating territorial disputes. As territorial disputes are 
among core interests of a state, they provide an issue over which leaders may rally a society to 
achieve other goals.21 Yet Fravel believes that this is unlikely to explain broad variations in the use of 
escalation strategies in territorial disputes as mobilization and diversion don’t account for external 
factors, but only some domestic issues. He also states that rallying the public around the issue of a 
territorial dispute is dangerous, since the costs of failure are substantial. 
While we are receiving the benefits of deepening general knowledge about territorial 
disputes, the studies to date lack a complete theoretical account of how states choose to pursue 
their territorial disputes. The above mentioned studies utilize mostly cross-sectional variation in the 
outcome of disputes, identifying those conflicts that are more likely to be settled or to experience 
the use of force. Thus, they focus on the structural conditions, ignoring choices leaders make within 
the same or similar structures. As such, although some might say that the value of land indeed varies 
across disputes, which explains variation, it is equally as valid to say that value of a land is relatively 
                                                          
18
 P.K. Huth, "Reputations and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment," Security Studies 7, no. 1 
(1997). 
19
 B.F. Walter, "Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict1," International Studies Review 5, no. 4 (2003). 
20
 P.F. Diehl and G. Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivalry (Univ of Michigan Pr, 2001); K.A. Rasler and 
W.R. Thompson, "Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and Conflict Escalation," International Studies 
Quarterly 50, no. 1 (2006). 
21
 T.J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 
1947-1958 (Princeton Univ Pr, 1996); J.S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," Handbook of war 
studies (1989). 
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constant in particular disputes. Thus, the aforementioned literature fails to explain how states would 
behave over time. They fail to explain dramatic decisions of states to cooperate or escalate.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes, 11. 
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3 Theory 
The purpose of this research is to test the theory of omnibalancing and the theory of 
preventive warfare beyond China. In order to do this, the two theories need to be explained, 
especially in the context of how Fravel applied them to the case of China. The theory of 
omnibalancing is based on Steven David’s explanation of third world alignments.23  It claims that 
national leaders will forge alliances to balance against the most pressing threat to state security, 
external or internal. The rationale is that territorial disputes carry some price or opportunity costs, 
such as not having diplomatic assistance, and when these costs outweigh the value of the land 
disputed, then a state needs to compromise in order to secure aid for a more pressing threat it faces. 
However, the balancing factor is irrelevant if a state is facing both a threat and a decline in its claim 
strength simultaneously. In such a case, the state will use force because there will be a perception 
that adversaries are seeking to profit from country’s internal difficulties.24 As for the preventive war 
theory, it assumes that a loss in a state’s relative position in a territorial dispute explains decisions to 
escalate a territorial dispute, to halt decline in its influence.25 The same theory implies that a state 
which faces a much stronger opponent is likely to use force when an adversary’s power suddenly and 
temporarily weakens, creating a window of opportunity to seize the land and strengthen otherwise 
weak negotiating position.26 Thus, the former theory focuses on cooperation while the latter theory 
focuses on escalation. 
The theory of omnibalancing and the preventive war theory imply that there are three 
general strategies for national leaders to adopt in territorial disputes. Each strategy precedes the 
final outcome of a dispute, as the final outcome depends on the response of the opposing side. There 
is a ‘delaying strategy’ involving doing nothing, whereby states maintain their territorial claims 
through public declarations but neither offer concessions nor use force. There is a ‘cooperation 
strategy’ which excludes the threat or use of force and involves an offer either to transfer control of 
some or all of the contested land to the opposing side or to drop claims to land held by the other 
state. Finally, there is the ‘escalation strategy’ which involves the threat or use of force to seize land 
or to coerce an opponent in a territorial dispute.27 
As this approach is in line with the state-centric approach of Stephen Krasner, a neorealist, as 
well as classical neorealism which deals with domestic factors, one can further specify the research 
                                                          
23
 S.R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations 
(1991). 
24
 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes, 8. 
25
 Ibid., 306. 
26
 Ibid., 5. 
27
 Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict. 
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question as follows: in an international system composed of sovereign states, why do states 
sometimes pursue compromise while at other times they escalate in solving territorial disputes?28 
Fravel exclaimed that “testing my theories in such a diverse set of disputes should improve its validity 
and potential application beyond China’s numerous conflicts”.29 Our task is to do precisely that. 
A state-centric approach means that the state is viewed as a unitary actor that exists apart 
from the society that it governs. The state seeks to maximise its autonomy to ensure both its survival 
abroad and its self-preservation at home.30 To achieve its goals, the state must manage varied 
challenges, such as consolidation of its territory. A state-centric approach is the most appropriate 
approach because territorial disputes are a matter of core state interests, namely sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. As well, a state as an autonomous actor inhabits both international and domestic 
arenas, which suggests that there are a range of factors that can create incentives for cooperation or 
escalation in territorial disputes. This combination of state’s domestic interests in addition to its 
foreign interests permits a more nuanced understanding of the sources and degree of state power in 
international relations, as scholars in the rationalist, as well as classical and neoclassical realist 
traditions have recognized.31 Overall, this means that I am shifting the analytical focus from dispute 
outcomes to individual state decisions, which are based on the perceptions of the leadership. Even 
Brad Williams, who focused on role of subnational units in territorial disputes, stated “it is central 
governments that ultimately make decisions regarding national border demarcation”.32 However, the 
state-centric approach does not mean that the wider context becames less important. In fact, a state 
has to make many policy decisions by taking into account the wider context, and this will especially 
become visible with the territorial disputes studied here. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?," International Security 27, no. 4 (2003). 
29
 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes, 40. 
30
 M. Mastanduno, D.A. Lake, and G.J. Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action," International 
Studies Quarterly (1989). 
31
 Morgenthau Hans J, "Politics among Nations," (Scintific Book Agency, 1966); R.L. Schweller, "The 
Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," Progress in international relations theory Appraising the field (2003). 
32
 Brad Williams, Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute: Hokkaido-Sakhalin Relations, Nissan 
Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies Series (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 15. 
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4 Methodology 
4.1 Hypotheses 
In order to accommodate the theory of omnibalancing and theory or preventive war into a 
research design, I have to state clear hypotheses implied by each theory. The first hypothesis is 
important because it defines the sensitivity of a state to changes in its claim strength: 
H1: A state is more likely to threaten or use force over more valuable land, while it is more likely to 
compromise over less valuable land. 
However, from the theory of omnibalancing, I can assume the following hypothesis: 
H2: A state is more likely to compromise when it faces either internal or external threats to its 
security, but it is more likely to threaten or use force if a threat coincides with a decline in its claim 
strength. 
From the theory of preventive war, I assume the following hypothesis: 
H3: A state is more likely to threaten or use force when its relative position in a dispute is declining, 
yet if a state has a weak claim already and its relative position suddenly and temporarily improves, it 
is also more likely to use force. 
 There are namely three scope conditions for these two theories: first, a state will choose to 
cooperate only if an opponent has an ability to provide military, economic, or diplomatic support. If 
the opponent state cannot provide these, giving it territorial concessions for free is illogical. Second, 
a state facing a relative decline or a temporary opportunity must possess a viable military option to 
either seize at least some of the disputed territory it contests or attack its opponent’s forces in the 
territory that the latter controls. 
4.2 Operalization of Variables/Concepts 
Perhaps the most important concept is a territorial dispute. It is to be defined as a conflicting 
claim by two or more states over the ownership of the same piece of land. The definition includes 
offshore islands but excludes disputes over maritime rights, such as exclusive economic zones.33 
Next, in line with the research question, definitions of status-quo and revisionist foreign policies are 
necessary. In relation to territorial disputes, status-quo policy involves doing nothing, maintaining a 
                                                          
33
 Hensel, "Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816–
1992," 90; Huth and Allee, The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century, 298. 
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territorial claim through public declarations but neither offering concessions, nor threats, or use of 
force. Thus, this is similar to a null hypothesis, whereby as long as there are no concessions or use of 
force, status-quo policy is in place. This is why status-quo policy will not be analyzed, as it is the 
default option of any government coming into power. The indicators of status-quo are the absence of 
cooperation or escalation policy. A cooperation strategy (1) excludes the threat or use of force and 
(2) includes an offer either to transfer control of some or all of the contested land to the opposing 
side or (3) it refers to a drop of a claim to land held by the other state. Such compromise must (4) 
precede the final settlement of a dispute in a bilateral treaty or agreement, even in those 
settlements where one state drops its entire claim. As for the escalation strategy, it involves (1) the 
threat or (2) use of force to seize the land or (3) to coerce an opponent in a territorial dispute.34 It is 
also worth mentioning what preventive war means. It is defined as “a war fought now in order to 
avoid the risks of war under worsening circumstances later.”35 
First variable that shapes the decisions to cooperate or escalate in a territorial dispute is the 
underlying value or salience of the contested land. Salience plays a critical role in determining the 
stakes in any territorial conflict and thus the odds that a state will either pursue compromise or 
threaten or use force. The lower the value of the land being disputed, the more likely a state will 
consider territorial concessions because it has less to lose through compromise. By contrasting logic, 
the higher the value of the land at stake, the more likely a state will consider escalation because it 
has more to lose through an unfavourable settlement of the dispute. This variable should be mostly 
constant in any particular conflict as the value of the land cannot easily change.36 There can be 
several dimensions of the value of the land: (1) symbolic (indicators would be a number of 
cultural/heritage sites, frequency of emphasis on this land in history books, presence of the land in 
popular tales); (2) economic (indicators would be access to an important trading routes such as rivers 
or ports, presence of valuable raw resources; how much land is arable; and energy potential of the 
land); and (3) military (does the land provide a natural barrier, does the land decrease the line of 
defence, does the land offer natural camouflage such as forests and mountains). 
 A second variable is ‘claim strength’, defined as bargaining power in the conflict or the ability 
of each side to control the land that it contests. It also plays a role in decisions to cooperate or 
escalate. States with strong claims will be more likely to compromise than those with weak claims. A 
strong-claim state can hope to use its power at the negotiating table to achieve a favourable 
                                                          
34
 Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict. 
35
 J.S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of 
International Relations (1987); S. Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Cornell Univ Pr, 
1999); D.C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Cornell Univ Pr, 2000). 
36
 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes, 37. 
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outcome and control over the land under dispute. A state with a weak claim will wait for its relative 
position to improve in order to achieve a more favourable settlement. I assume that ‘claim strength’ 
can shift over time, and thus create different incentives to cooperate or escalate in specific conflicts. 
A state whose bargaining power is increasing steadily at its opponent’s expense will be less likely to 
use force because it is even more optimistic about achieving a favourable settlement and thus 
control over disputed land. By contrast, a state whose position in a dispute is deteriorating relative to 
its opponent will be more likely to use force to arrest its decline. The greater the rate of decline, the 
more likely a state will threaten or even use force to defend its claim. Claim strength can have 
several dimensions: (1) legal and political strength (examples of indicators are: support from 
international arbiters, loyalty of the citizens in the disputed territory), (2) economic strength 
(example of indicators: state investment, such infrastructure, in the disputed territory compared to 
the other disputant(s)), and finally (3) military strength (examples of indicators: increased troop 
strength; military fortifications or set up positions nearby; new military capabilities in the area).  
A third variable is the overall security environment in which a state maintains territorial 
claims against another state. There are external and internal threats.  In the absence of both internal 
and external threats to its security, a state has little reason to pursue cooperation in a dispute and 
would be expected to delay a settlement instead. As a state’s security environment worsens, 
however, it should be more willing to pursue compromise to garner military, economic, or diplomatic 
aid to counter the specific threat that it faces. A security environment is the broadest concept in 
terms of dimensions and indicators. As mentioned, an external threat is one type of a security 
problem. It can have the following dimensions, (1) a threat from the strongest states in the system, 
stemming from an imbalance of power. This is based on structural realist assumptions.37 The logic is 
that a state declining in power relative to other states will pursue compromise to maintain its 
influence and arrest its decline. Also, a state rising in power relative to others may offer concessions 
to prevent the formation of a counter-balancing coalition by stronger states. A second dimension (2) 
is a competition with a specific state. The logic of compromise in this context draws on balance of 
threat theory and the literature on rivalries.38 The threat here arises with the initiation or 
intensification of security competition with a specific country. Again, an important emphasis is that if 
a state encounters both a decline in its claim strength in a dispute and other threats in its security 
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environment, it may exaggerate the stakes in the conflict and be even more willing to use force than 
if it was just managing the consequences of relative decline.39 
Both types of external threats can have the following dimensions: political security (example 
indicators would be answers to the following questions: Is the regime about to be overthrown or 
removed by an external force? Is another state’s rise threatening power balance in the world?40); 
economic security (example indicators would be affirmative answers to these questions: Is the state 
facing an economic collapse? Is another state’s rise in economic power threatening? Are economic 
sanctions threatened or being implemented?); military security (example indicators would be 
answers to the following questions: Are any countries threatening war or sabotage? Is there a 
presence of uninvited foreign military units in the country or a friendly country? Are other 
threatening states performing any military actions to which the state has objected on security 
grounds?) As for scope conditions, security goals can be stated as follows, and thus only states which 
can offer one of the following are considered for cooperation: (1) direct assistance or an alliance that 
strengthens its military power and diplomatic influence; (2) to deny potential allies to an adversary or 
rival by improving ties with third parties; or (3) to facilitate internal balancing through increased 
bilateral trade or the marshaling of resources for defense. 
There are also internal threats, defined as ‘threats to regime security, which itself is defined 
as the strength, stability, and legitimacy of a state’s core political institutions’.41 The dimensions are 
as follows: political security (indicator example would be the question is the regime threatened to be 
overthrown or removed by domestic actors42); economic security (example indicators would be 
affirmative answers to these questions: Is the state facing an economic collapse? Is the economy 
largely benefitting few individuals at the expense of others?); military security (For example, is there 
a presence of unloyal military units in the country?) States pursuing internal security seek the 
following types of support from neighbours: (1) direct assistance in countering internal threats, such 
as denying material support to opposition groups; (2) indirect aid in marshalling of resources for 
domestic policy priorities, not external defense; or (3) bolstering international recognition of the 
regime, leveraging the status-quo bias within international society to delegitimize domestic 
challengers.43 
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 Combined together, these variables outline the conditions under which states will most likely 
shift from a strategy of delaying settlement of a dispute, adopting strategies of either cooperation or 
escalation. Again, a state is most likely to pursue cooperation in disputes over less salient land, while 
its claim strength is stable, strong, or strengthening, or when security threats arise abroad or at 
home that can be countered by improving ties with a territorial adversary. A state is more likely to 
pursue escalation in disputes over more salient land, while its relative position in the dispute is 
declining or, when it simultaneously faces declining relative position and a security threat. However, 
a state will also use force as an opportunity to gain leverage while a stronger opponent has a 
temporarily weaker position. By implication, then, a state is most likely to delay in its most important 
disputes, while its claim strength is stable, strong, or strengthening, and it faces a benign security 
environment abroad and at home.44 
4.3 Case Selection 
As was previously stated, many of the previous studies have dealt with structural conditions, 
which focus on the arrangement of relations between states, whether it is balance of power or 
democracy, while lacking explanations of strategies within structures. Thus, to minimize the effect of 
structural conditions, I have selected a single case of Russia, which contains territorial disputes which 
themselves contain both strategies of cooperation and escalation. Choosing Russia controls for 
factors which may explain interstate differences, such as political culture, but it also reduces the 
effects of other confounding variables. For example, Russia has a history as a great power. It is 
multiethnic and has a long tradition of territorial problems. It also used to be an ideological 
superpower. Many of these points are similar to China, which also has a history as a great power, 
multiethnic composition and a long tradition of territorial problems. Its ideology used to be in line 
with the Soviet Union’s. For these reasons we can be sure that any potential failure to apply the 
theory of omnibalancing and the theory of preventive warfare will not be due to confounding 
variables (for example, if I had chosen Pakistan, and my hypotheses failed, one could claim that this is 
because Pakistan is/has been an Islamic state, a military regime, or such). This may make findings of 
this research less generalizable to the whole world, but then again, if the theory of omnibalancing 
and the theory of preventive warfare pass the test in the Soviet Union/Russia, then one can be sure 
that these theories apply at least to states with above characteristics. Any future research will then 
either a) attempt to generalize by testing less-likely cases to see if the above characteristics make any 
difference in results; b) attempt to explain deviant cases among other similar countries, if there is a 
belief that deviant cases exist. Finally, Russia is intrinsically rich as a state that had a large portion of 
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its borders under dispute. For instance, at the beginning of 1991, nearly a quarter of Russia’s 61,000 
kilometers of border was not formally recognized and specified in any international treaties.45 
Case study on Russia has been broken down as follows. I have followed Van Evera’s 
suggestion of using congruence procedure for theory testing. First, this means a comparison of a case 
to ‘typical’ or ‘expected values’. This is what Van Evera calls ‘congruence procedure type 1: 
comparison to typical values.’46 I have used values expected from the hypotheses. Variation in land 
value (h1) posits that Russia should more often compromise on low-value territory, while escalate on 
high-value territory. This is why I have included disputes such as the Estonian-Russian border conflict, 
but also the Kuril Islands. Then for the theory of omnibalancing, (h2) I present cases with high 
internal and/or external threats to Russia’s security, where the expectation is an extreme outcome, 
namely, a lot of compromise. However, when a threat coincides with a losing territorial claim, 
opposite should be true, which is tested here on Russia during its early 1990s period. For the theory 
of preventive warfare, (h3) I present cases of Russian strong decline in a relative position in a dispute, 
where the expected outcome is use of force. As well, this study also includes one case, Kuril Islands 
dispute, where a state with a very weak claim suddenly improved its relative position, but only 
temporarily. Here, the expected outcome is also use of force. Naturally, Russia’s rich history in the 
past century or so gives us variation on almost all the variables, for example, situations when Russia 
faced powerful threats and situations when Russia faced minor threats, and so on. Second, in 
addition to comparing Russia’s variation to theoretical predictions, in this study I used ‘congruence 
procedure type 2: Multiple-within case comparisons’, which essentially means looking at one case 
though different time periods, to see if values covary in accordance to our predictions. Overall, the 
case of Russia was selected based on within-case variance and data richness. 
4.4 Data Collection Methods 
Since this research is from a state-centric view emphasizing perceptions of the national 
leadership and its interests, the primary evidence has been sought in government documents, 
agreements, treaties and statements of leaders to determine the reasoning behind each decision of 
cooperation or escalation. The content, namely, the economic, security and political environment 
during the episodes of cooperation and escalation, was looked at as it was perceived by the 
leadership and sources close to it. Many secondary sources were sought as well, especially media 
articles covering important events in relation to each dispute, and studies which have dealt with 
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Russian territorial disputes were also useful. A lot of credits should go to the glasnost period when 
openness and transparency led to a discovery of many important sources in the Soviet archives. 
To clarify which data have been sought for which particular concepts, the following points 
are noteworthy. Treaties and agreements have been an important source for finding evidence on 
cooperation. Escalation and use of force is usually well-recorded in history books and media at the 
time; however, a few witnesses through public statements have filled in information when data was 
controversial or lacking. Data for the first variable (value of the land) stemmed from three sources. 
First, for symbolic value, I have utilized cultural, religious and educational books, popular tales, as 
well as official data on heritage sites. Second, for the economic value of the land, geological surveys 
were useful, official publications on development projects, as well as official documents on trading 
routes and similar issues. Third, for the military value, military publications or statements were 
relevant when mentioning the disputed territory. As for the second variable, claim strength, since it 
also contains political/symbolic, economic and military types of strength, a similar approach has been 
used, namely by looking at official statements for the political/symbolic strength; governmental, 
geological and business ventures and publications for the economic strength; and military 
publications, statements and interviews for the military strength. Interviews have been utilized 
whenever there was some missing or controversial data. As for the third variable, security 
environment, I mentioned that it is divided into external and internal components. Looking for 
external and internal threats, however, can seem to be difficult given many different perceptions of 
what constitutes a threat. However, data for threats has only been marked as relevant if it came 
from prominent political or societal figures, found strictly in the primary oral and written evidence of 
the leadership or persons influential to it. Thus, any threat not perceived as such by the leadership 
was not relevant, as it is the leadership which has the ultimate say over interests of the state. It is 
true that a leadership may downplay or exaggerate a particular threat, and for this reason it was 
necessary to verify threats by looking at actions of the governments in response to particular 
situations: legislative documents, the budget, media, military movement and interviews. The time 
period of all the data for this study begins with the Bolshevik revolution until today. 
4.5 Scope and Limitations 
 There are certain phenomena which lie beyond the scope of this research. The first limitation 
is that I do not identify sources of delaying strategy (status-quo) in territorial disputes. It is the least 
costly and most used strategy, as it carries no costs, especially if the opponent is also using the same 
strategy; however, this research does not seek to explain why and when states might adopt this 
strategy. This is due to material and spatial limitations of a project of this size. I assume it is when 
20 
 
costs to a cooperation or escalation policy outweigh the benefits. As such, it is the default option for 
not using cooperation or escalation, and the theory based here starts from this assumption. A second 
phenomenon beyond the scope of this essay is the initiation of territorial disputes in the first place.47 
This research seeks to understand actions of states once these disputes already exist, not why or 
when they are created. The following chapters assess the empirical evidence to test the theory by 
dissecting each case in two ways. First, I will look to see whether Russia’s behaviour across each of its 
disputes is consistent with the mechanisms of the theory. That is, is variation of behaviour consistent 
with the theory? Second, I will analyze what led the Russian leadership to change from delaying 
strategy to escalation or cooperation. 
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5 The Kuril Islands Dispute 
 
 
 
Territorial dispute over Kuril Islands is an important case within Russia’s history because it 
contains an unresolved outcome, one which persisted for over 100 years. For some, it is mysterious 
that even no peace treaty has been signed between Russia and Japan. It is worth glassing over history 
of this territory prior to 1905, when I start the analysis. In early 1800’s, the area around Kuril Islands 
were under a sort of condominium under joint Russo-Japanese sovereignty. In 1855, Treaty of 
Shimoda was signed to divide Kuril Islands in such a way that four southernmost islands in the Kuril 
chain were acknowledged to belong to Japan, while Urup and other islands north of it belonged to 
Russia. Sakhalin Island was not discussed.48 However, since Russians, Japanese and Ainu lived on 
Sakhalin side by side, there was constant conflict between these groups, even violence, but a legal 
limbo prevented proper handling of these issues. This led to the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875, 
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giving Russia sovereignty over Sakhalin in exchange for giving the entire Kurile Islands chain to 
Japan.49 
5.1 Value of the Land 
 The value of Kuril Islands to Russia can be taken from several statements. First is the strategic 
value of the islands. One can observe the strategic value in comments made by Anastas Mikoyan, 
then first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers (highest-ranking Soviet official to visit Japan). 
During his stay in Japan in 1961 and 1964, he stated the following, “most of the Soviet Union is 
frozen, so each acre of Japanese land is worth one hundred acres of Soviet soil….Etorofu and 
Kunashiri may only be small islands, but they are the gateway to Kamchatka and cannot be 
abandoned.”50 Value of Kuril Islands increased immensely after Sea of Okhotsk became strategically 
important location for the Soviet Union to station submarines. Namely, in 1978, Soviet Union 
employed a “bastion strategy” of transforming the Sea of Okhotsk into a “sanctuary” for ballistic-
missile firing nuclear submarines of the Soviet Pacific Fleet.51 The whole area very quickly received 
sonar barriers, radars, stockpiled mines and depth-charges, a naval base, and even an airfield. By the 
start of 1990s, however, the value of the area dropped as submarine-launched missiles were able to 
reach any target in North America from the Barents Sea, reducing the need for a “sanctuary”.52 Thus, 
the Sea of Okhotsk reverted to its pre-1978 low strategic status.53 
 Second is the economic value of the islands, which is mediocre. They have no petroleum 
potential, and whatever deposits of tin, zinc, lead, nickel, sulphur and metallic sulphides is present, it 
would be marginal to Russia’s existing mineral resources, especially due to the infrastructure that 
would need to be put in place.54 Deposits of titanium, magnetite, nickel, copper, chromium, 
vanadium and niobium are slightly more valuable, yet the highest economic value is seen in fishing 
potentials. It is said to be one the world’s three great fishing grounds, containing the spawning 
grounds for several commercially viable fish species.55 According to calculations by the Russian State 
Fisheries Committee, the fishing industry in the Russian Far East stands to lose US$1-2 billion a year if 
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the South Kuril Islands are transferred to Japan.56 Lastly, the islands also possibly have oil and gas 
reserves.57 
 Finally, there is a symbolic value attached to the islands. The four islands are considered a 
reward after Russia’s bloody struggle with Japan and thus many political figures in Russia consider it 
a ‘sacred territory’, such as Dmitrii Rogozin, Igor Farkhutdinov, Vladimir Zhirinovsky or Valentin 
Fedorov.58 In fact, the symbolic value of the islands matters the most to the local Russian residents, 
who believe that this was the land won with the blood of Russian soldiers.59 According to 1991 survey 
in Sakhalin oblast (region) of Russia, only 2.7 percent of respondents favoured to return the islands 
to Japan.60 They believed that islands were an inalienable part of the motherland and that the entire 
Kuril archipelago was discovered, settled and developed by Russians. Especially after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, Russians were most vehemently opposed to giving up Kuril Islands. “The Kurils were 
the last straw for Russians, whose national pride was already wounded. With the Kurils they were 
compensating for what they had lost elsewhere – getting their emotional revenge for their national 
humiliation.”61 In fact, symbolic value of the Kuril Islands has been emphasized as being the most 
important factor in the dispute because the public opinion is strongly against giving up these islands. 
The Russian leadership must obey rising nationalist feelings of the public, whose feelings have been 
hurt by Soviet Union’s loss of territory. In the media, any act of compromise is equivalent to 
treason.62 
5.2 Tracing the Negotiations 
 1904-5 is the period when cooperative relationship over Kuril Islands between Russia and 
Japan ended. At this time, Japan launched an attack against Russia due to failure of two sides to 
peacefully resolve problems related to Manchuria and Korea, territories which Russia occupied but 
Japan desired. This clash of interests, and the subsequent Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 led to 
war.63 Japanese forces have dealt humiliating defeats for the Russian forces, but since both sides 
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were facing exhaustion, they agreed for the United States to mediate a peace agreement.64 Peace 
conference was held in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, where the Treaty of Portsmouth was concluded 
on September 5, 1905. Russia was to withdraw her troops from Manchuria and Korea, as well as cede 
southern part of Sakhalin Island to Japan, but would not be required to pay any indemnity.65 Treaty 
of Portsmouth is considered legal as both sides signed it and agreed to its conditions. 
 When Russia faced the October revolution of 1917, which brought tsarism to an end, 
establishing a Soviet administration, many Western powers, plus Japan, intervened to extend their 
interests in Russia. Japan landed a military force in the area near Vladivostok and occupied most of 
the trans-Siberian railway east of Lake Baikal.66 This led to the creation of a Far Eastern Republic, to 
serve as a buffer zone between the Soviet state and Japan. It was annexed by the Soviet Union in 
1922 after the last Japanese troops left Vladivostok. During this period, in 1920 precisely, Bolshevik 
partisans clashed with Japanese troops in Nikolaevsk, near the mouth of the Amur River, where 
partisans executed 384 civilians and 351 soldiers as a punishment of Japan’s meddling in Russia’s 
internal affairs.67 Out of revenge, Japan occupied northern part of Sakhalin Island and kept troops 
there until 1925. 
 Soon after, Japan faced a clash of interests with United States, partially due to political and 
economic challenge Americans posed in East Asia, therefore Japan desired to establish a friendly 
relationship with the Soviet Russia, although ‘painted red’ due to previous bloodshed.68 Since the 
Soviet Union needed to find international allies as well, it agreed to sign the Convention Embodying 
the basic Rules of the Relations Between Japan and the USSR and Japan in 1925. It is also known as 
the Peking Convention or the Japanese-Soviet Basic Treaty.69 Under Article 2, the Soviet Union 
recognized the legal validity of the Treaty of Portsmouth, namely, that Southern Sakhalin was ceded 
to Japan. However, this relative calm lasted only until 1938. By that time, Japan had already 
established a puppet state in Manchuria (Manchukuo) and concluded Anti-Comintern Pact (1936).70 
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This led to full scale border clashes, such as Changkufeng incident and the attempted Japanese 
invasion of Mongolia, where Soviets decisively humiliated the Japanese battle after battle.71 
 Just as World War II was unfolding, relations between major powers in the world became 
quite complex. Essentially, even though the Soviet Union and Japan just experienced brief, but full-
scale clashes, Japan in 1940 sought a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, in order for Japan to 
concentrate its forces against China. However, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov said that such a pact 
was only possible if Japan returned “Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands”.72 Otherwise, the 
Soviets would only agree to a neutrality pact. Japanese rejected the Soviet conditionality, so on April 
12th of 1940, Stalin agreed only on a neutrality pact.73 However, as World War II proceeded and allies 
became more determined to defeat Japan, they issued the Cairo Declaration in November of 1943, 
which declares that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has taken by 
violence and greed.74 Russians assumed that this also applied to previous treaties in which Japan had 
the upper hand as the victor in forcing Russians to secede their territory. 
 As the World War II was coming to a close, the Soviet Union with its Western allies organized 
the secret Yalta Conference in February of 1945 on how to proceed with the war, where Stalin 
expressed his desire to return Sakhalin and Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union by attacking Japan. 
Roosevelt intended to grant this wish to the Soviet Union as a reward for entering the war against 
Japanese.75 Yalta Agreement was signed and it stated under Article 3 that Sakhalin and Kuril Islands 
shall be returned to the Soviet Union. Thus, in August of 1945 Soviet Union declared war on Japan 
and quite easily seized Kuril Islands while Japan faced exhaustion from its war with the United States.  
Russia in the process did violate the timing of end of the neutrality pact76, however, legitimacy of this 
neutrality pact during the war was often scrutinized rhetorically, even by the Japanese.77 
Nonetheless, Potsdam Declaration ended the war, officially carrying out terms of the Cairo 
Declaration stated above.78 President Truman also lived up to the Yalta agreement by allowing the 
Soviet Union to occupy Kuril Islands, but this was not officially stated in the Potsdam Declaration.79 
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After the war, Stalin made a speech stating that the occupation of Kuril Islands was an opportunity 
for Russia to be avenged for defeat in the Russo-Japanese War.80 Later on, Soviet authorities issued 
decrees unilaterally integrating all the occupied islands into the Soviet Union.81 
Virtually, for ten years after WWII, the Soviet-Japanese relations did not exist and legally they 
were still ‘at war’. Even their interpretation of legal historical documents did not match, with each 
side stating that international agreements supported their claim while accusing the opponent of 
violating international legal obligations.82 In 1951, Soviet Union missed a chance to sign a peace 
treaty with Japan at San Francisco Peace Conference, primarily because the treaty stated that Japan 
was forced to relinquish the Kuril Islands, but it did not specify to which country the territory was to 
be relinquished. American objections to clearly specify that the Soviet Union was the sovereign over 
this territory made Soviets abstain from signing, which in retrospect was a bad diplomatic move by 
Soviets as it led to a legal ambiguity of the status of Kuril Islands.83 
In 1955, the Soviet Union and Japan normalized their relations after holding the ‘London 
Talks’, but they stalled over the territorial issue. More precisely, the Soviets were prepared to return 
Habomai and Shikotan islands, but the Japanese demanded the return of all four islands because 
Americans leveraged the Japanese not to accept only two.84 This did not prevent further diplomatic 
initiatives to normalize relations between the two states, leading to the Soviet-Japanese Joint 
Declaration, signed in Moscow in 1956. It was here that the Japanese agreed to remove the clause 
which stated that the two sides had a territorial question to resolve.85 This was a Japanese blunder, 
as after that, Soviets insisted that there was no territorial issue to discuss. The only reference to the 
Kuril Islands was a statement that only after a peace treaty was signed the Soviet Union would hand 
over Habomai and Shikotan Islands.86 Since the peace treaty never materialized, all up to the 1970s 
Japan’s relationship with the Soviet Union was rather stagnant. Even worse, in late 1970s the Soviet 
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Union committed itself to increase its military capabilities and was in no mood to diplomatically 
engage Japan. As a matter of fact, in 1978-9, the Soviet Union stationed troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, 
and Shikotan, thus increasing its claim over the islands, allegedly in response to a perceived 
encirclement by the US, China and Japan.87 Soviet actions in Afghanistan did not help either as Japan 
reacted by following the American lead in imposing sanctions on the Soviet Union and holding joint 
military maneuvers.88 In 1981 Japan actually escalated its claim over the four southern islands by 
designating a “Northern Territories Day”, and sending its Prime Minister Suzuki to the border area.89 
Soviets were outraged and continued to militarize the islands until Gorbachev’s rule. 
Gorbachev period in the Soviet history was a positive factor for Soviet-Japanese relations, but 
not necessarily for the territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands. For example, Gorbachev 
acknowledged that a territorial dispute existed, and he also cancelled Khrushchev’s 1960 
memorandum90, among many other positive measures such as cultural exchanges and signing of the 
Japan-Soviet Joint Communiqué. Yet for Japanese it was shocking that Gorbachev did not accept the 
1956 Joint Declaration in its entirety.91 In other words, for Japanese he was not much better than 
Khrushchev. 
Yeltsin’s rule brought the two sides very close to a resolution of the dispute. At first, in 1990, 
Yeltsin started off with a desire to acknowledge and resolve the territorial dispute.92 Only shortly 
after he advocated that Gorbachev should not compromise on the issue.93 However, in 1991 after 
attempted coup d’état, Yeltsin, as a president of the Russian Federation, immediately approached 
Japan by sending a letter that a peace treaty and the territorial dispute must be settled as soon as 
possible.94 Two months later he wrote a similar letter to the Russian people, supported by his foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev.95 Japan responded favourably by offering a very flexible approach toward 
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settling the territorial dispute. Yeltsin promised to visit Japan, but he kept delaying and cancelling his 
trip until his power base became too eroded by the nationalist and conservative forces, and 
therefore his confidence that he could solve this problem.96 But he finally did visit Japan in October of 
1993 (while he ordered tanks to shell the parliament at home) where he made progress on the 
territorial issue by acknowledging it, mentioning four islands under dispute instead of two (Habomai, 
Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu), accepting the 1956 Joint Declaration of Japan in its entirety (thus 
confirming that Russia will hand over Habomai and Shikotan), and accepting all treaties and 
agreements as relevant for solving the problem.97 This became known as the Tokyo Declaration.  
The problem for Japan is that although Yeltsin basically made two steps forward (out of 
three), he later made comments indicating that a lot more work was needed before settling the 
territorial issue. This irritated the Japanese but they still sought to improve relations with Russia, 
especially economically.98 This led to an agreement of cooperation in areas of fishing, as well as 
granting of visa-free travel to Japanese families visiting the Kuril Islands. Two other agreements were 
also achieved during various visits in 1997 and 1998. First was an agreement to conclude a peace 
treaty by the year 2000. Second was the Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan, which planned for Japan to provide 
economic assistance to Russia. It led to even further agreements such as during the Kawana Summit. 
In November of 1998 an additional agreement was reached to reaffirm previous agreements. It was 
called Moscow Declaration to Build a Creative partnership Between Japan and Russia (also called 
‘Moscow Declaration’). It also included creation of committees to draw a demarcation line around 
four disputed islands. However, Yeltsin’s failing health soon reversed much of this progress as new 
faces in Kremlin rejected not only many previous proposals, but also agreements such as Hashimoto-
Yeltsin Plan.99 Later research discovered that if Yeltsin had ever compromised on this issue, he would 
have been overthrown.100 
Putin, as soon as he replaced Yeltsin, showed little interest in resolving the territorial dispute 
with Japan or concluding a peace treaty, despite his early visit to Japan in 2000. He did acknowledge 
the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, but preferred to not to have it mentioned in the summit.101 
In 2001, Mori and Putin met in Irkutsk and issued a joint statement validating the 1956 Japan-Soviet 
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Joint Declaration.102 Overall, there were several summits, but relations took a hard hit after Junichiro 
Koizumi took over as Japan’s prime minister.103 Nonetheless, the two sides worked together to repair 
the relationship which led to the Japan-Russia Action Plan, which was a comprehensive package to 
solve the territorial dispute by focusing on all areas of cooperation. When Putin got re-elected as the 
President in 2004, siloviki (power holders with security and military background), who were tough on 
any territorial compromises, gained more representation in the Russian politics.104 Putin maintained 
the commitment to the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration, but did not promise anything else. 
However, Sergei Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister, did state that Russia was ready to negotiate, as 
long as a comprehensive package was included and Japan was ready to compromise as well.105 
Whether Russia was aware of this or not, Japan did reject the idea of getting back anything less than 
all four islands.106 In 2005, Putin retaliated with equally uncompromising statement, namely that all 
four islands are Russian territory and there is nothing to discuss.107 Later, he clarified that he meant 
that Japan needs to show good will towards Russia, and Russia will reciprocate by giving the two 
islands it promised.108 Yet Japan did not heed Putin’s statement. 
In 2008 Dmitry Medvedev assumed office as the Russian president until 2012. Medvedev 
immediately faced a challenge from Japan, where textbooks were being published claiming that 
Japan has sovereignty over the Kuril Islands. The Russian Ministry of Foreign affairs responded by 
reaffirming Russia’s sovereignty over the islands. Medvedev and Japanese Prime Minister did meet in 
Sakhalin in 2009 but they only agreed to speed up their efforts to find a solution. Nonetheless, 
situation on the ground deteriorated as Japanese fishermen were fired upon for illegally fishing in 
the Russian territorial waters. In 2010 Medvedev visited the disputed islands, which also caused a 
diplomatic row between the two countries.109 Overall, even with this diplomatic confrontation, the 
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situation was nothing new in Moscow, where leaders, in order to secure their electoral victory, 
needed to appease the powerful siloviki group and the Russian public opinion.110 
5.3 Changing Factors 
 The first factor worth examining is the sudden willingness of Russia to accept the Treaty of 
Portsmouth in 1905 when much of the Russian military personnel believed that Russia could recoup 
by continuing the war to reverse the losses. However, at this time, the Russian society was in a state 
of chaos, just short of a revolution.111 Given that only several months later exactly this occurred, 
seriousness of internal threats to Russia cannot be downplayed. It can then be interpreted that 
Russia conceded much of its territory at a time when continued fighting was possible, but very costly. 
Russia chose to make peace with Japan, which confirms the theory of omnibalancing, namely that 
compromise is more likely when a state faces either internal and/or external threat(s) to its security. 
To test my hypotheses why the USSR eventually escalated in this territorial dispute during 
the Second World War, it is worth examining which factor most strongly represents the change 
between status-quo and escalation policy. Considering that by the summer of 1945 Japan’s national 
resources were completely exhausted, Soviet attack on a weak Japan was an act of a traditionally 
weaker claimant who saw an opportunity to seize a territory from the stronger claimant, while the 
stronger claimant was facing other threats and thus was unable to respond. Two points are worth 
reiterating here. First, Japan was the stronger claimant prior to the World War II. Second, Japan was 
unable to respond to the Soviet challenge due to its war with United States. In other words, Soviet 
Union perceived a temporary shift in the balance of power to increase its bargaining position over 
the disputed islands. This affirms my hypothesis on escalation. More precisely, states will escalate 
their territorial dispute if they believe there is a temporary ‘window of opportunity’. 
After the Second World War, I already stated that for a decade, relations between the USSR 
and Japan were non-existent. Just before signing of the Joint Declaration, relations improved and the 
USSR offered to return Habomai and Shikotan to Japan since the USSR was facing a hostile 
international environment. USSR needed to increase its international standing, and better relations 
with Japan was one way to do that. However, it is important to note that by this time Japan has just 
regained its independence for four years, and has not yet consolidated its alliance with the US, which 
was to come in a few years. Thus, for the Soviet Union, it is very likely that USSR expected Japan 
would move in a more independent direction if the territorial dispute was resolved. Again, this 
affirms the hypothesis that compromise occurs in relation to a certain perceived threat. 
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However, one factor led the USSR to try and unilaterally change the offer on the Declaration. 
It was Khrushchev’s memorandum to Japan in 1960, stating that the content of a revised U.S.-Japan 
Treaty of Cooperation and Security was unacceptable and that the Soviet Union unilaterally amends 
the offer to transfer the two islands. Japan now had to not only sign the peace treaty with the Soviet 
Union, but also all American troops had to withdraw from Japan, in order to receive the two 
islands.112 This perhaps contradicts my hypothesis that internal and external threats will lead to 
cooperation. Instead, here Khrushchev used coercion, or punishment of Japan, when facing a 
growing anti-Soviet alliance. However contradictory this may sound to my hypothesis, the inverse 
logic proves otherwise. Let’s consider this. Khrushchev desired to cooperate if only Japan was to help 
Soviets undermine American power. In other words, this is where scope conditions must be restated. 
Cooperation only occurs towards states which have something to offer in helping counter a certain 
threat. Japan at the moment of Khrushchev’s letter could not offer anything to the USSR. Thus, 
Khrushchev’s action was logical to my theory. After all, in 1969 he stated that if he had relinquished 
the islands to Japan, they would have become American military bases.113 Compromise would have 
been counterproductive. 
As for the 1978-9 deployment of Soviet troops onto Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands 
(escalation), one can still observe Khrushchev’s logic, although the hypotheses on escalation 
definitely do not apply here. Namely, the deployment of Soviet troops was a response to yet another 
external threat: Japan and China’s Peace and Friendship Treaty of August of 1978.114 The effect of 
this treaty was that it increased the threat posed by the United States. One can also state that the 
Soviets deployed troops and military installations on Kuril Islands for another reason - sudden 
increase in the value of land. Specifically, the value increased because Soviets built and stationed 
nuclear submarines (SSBNs) in the Sea of Okhotsk in order to be able to target North America west of 
the Great Lakes.115 But a more realistic explanation is that the escalation took place in order to 
punish Japan for mingling with China, and also to strategically improve own position due to a threat 
coming from the United States. Value of the land would have not changed without the threat. My 
hypotheses do not predict this. 
 There is one factor which dramatically reduced the Russian claim strength over the Kuril 
Islands. It is the discovery of the Draft of the Additional Instruction to Admiral Putiatin, issued on 
February 27, 1853, in the name of Tsar Nicholas I. Existence of this document was only unearthed on 
October 4, 1991 by Professor Koichi Yasuda at Naval archives in St. Petersburg, and Professor 
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Konstantin O. Sarkisov.116 The importance of this document is that it gave tremendous legal weight to 
Japan’s claim over the Southern Kuril Islands since the Russian Tsar Nicholas I proclaimed in this 
document the following: 
On the border issue…The southernmost island of the Kurile Islands that belongs to Russia is Uruppu, 
which we could identify as the last point of Russian authority in the south – so that from our side, the 
southern tip of this island would be the border with Japan.117 
Thus, this proclamation nullified all Soviet statements that Kuril Islands, particularly the four 
southern islands, always belonged to Russia.118 Yet the document had little impact on Yeltsin. Already 
in September of 1991 he sent a delegation to Japan urgently seeking to sign a peace treaty and to 
resolve the territorial dispute. Thus, there was no escalation on the Russian part, despite its losing 
claim on the islands. Instead, Yeltsin only continued his initial policy of cooperation. This cooperation 
can only be understood in the context of internal threats Russia faced, such as the attempted coup 
d’état and a widespread poverty creating nationalist sentiment.119 Yeltsin sought cooperation with 
Japan while facing these threats. For example, he visited Japan while shelling the parliament at 
home.120  Of course, such cooperation may have been a bluff, as already indicated, but bluffing is a 
dangerous policy, not surprisingly the reason why Yeltsin became extremely unpopular in Japan and 
Russia.121 While Yeltsin’s cooperation can be understood within the framework of my theory, the 
failure of Russia to escalate after it lost the legal claim cannot be explained by my theoretical 
framework. Even more so, the theoretical expectation is that escalation occurs when a losing claim 
coincides with an internal or external threat. In 1991 Yeltsin faced tremendous internal unrest and a 
losing claim, but he did not escalate.  
5.4 Alternative Theories 
The first group of alternative theories are ideational theories. Analysis of democracies does 
not apply to Russia, as Russian democracy is seen as semi-democratic or a ‘managed democracy’. 
Analyzing alliance partners in a territorial conflict also does not apply here since Japan was never an 
ally of Russia. As for the presence of a norm against conquest that would make states more likely to 
offer concessions, since I already noted that Russia seized Kuril Islands in World War II despite the 
Cairo Declaration of 1943 where allies established a norm against forceful seizure, then logically such 
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norm mattered very little. The theory on norms, however, may best explain Yeltsin’s failure to 
escalate while he faced domestic problems plus a losing territorial claim due to the discovery of the 
Draft of the Additional Instruction to Admiral Putiatin. Namely, Yeltsin started pursuing compromise 
only a few months before the discovery of the draft. That is, if he was to suddenly change his stance, 
it would have violated norms of agreement. However, if he was just bluffing to extract economic 
concessions from Japan, then discovery of this document is irrelevant.122 
Among ideational theories there is a stipulation that states with high or growing levels of 
economic interdependence may be more likely to compromise in their disputes in order to increase 
trade or investment. There is some truth here. Yeltsin and Gorbachev both sought to secure 
Japanese investment by promising a resolution of the territorial problem. “The essence of the 
Kremlin’s policy is to extract the largest possible amount of material and technical aid in exchange for 
vague promises of a resolution to the territorial problem.”123 Thus, I assume that at least part of the 
compromise in late 1980s and early 1990s was in desire to gain economic benefits. However, since 
there is evidence that this was a bluff, it is uncertain whether there really was any real desire to 
compromise. Additionally, economic interdependence hardly existed between Russia and Japan, 
presenting itself as a goal more than a factor in this case. 
In the realist camp there is the argument that states should most likely use force when they 
can seize the disputed land at an acceptable cost or impose a favourable settlement on their 
adversary. There is also an explanation that a state will use force in a territorial dispute not because 
of the importance of the land being contested but because of the need to invest in a general 
reputation for toughness, as well as to challenge a rival. Only the rivalry explanation has some 
relevance here, which is when Japan and China signed the Peace and Friendship Treaty in August of 
1978. This is when the USSR escalated by sending troops to the disputed islands instead of 
compromising. My theoretical approach would predict compromise, but since compromise did not 
occur, the only relevant explanation is one which falls within the framework of the Soviet rivalry with 
the United States.124 As stated earlier, the Sea of Okhotsk became a bastion of Soviet nuclear 
submarines. It was thus important to occupy the islands irrespective to how Japan might react, since 
the United States and China were a much more pressing threat.125 This is one alternative theory that 
does have validity in this case, and is worth recalling in conclusion. 
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Finally, a neo-classical realist camp would argue that as territorial disputes are among core 
interests of states, they provide an issue over which leaders may rally a society to achieve other 
goals, and there is evidence that Yeltsin did just that, as he refused to go ‘all the way’ due to fears 
that he will end up being unpopular like Gorbachev.126 Nationalism was a potent force in Russia and 
Yeltsin did not dare to enflame it against himself. In effect, this alternative explanation may then best 
explain Yeltsin’s bluffing, who may have wanted to compromise with Japan, but did not dare to do so 
due to the ‘rallied society’ that was watching him. 
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6 Sino-Soviet Border Conflict 
 
The Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China inherited their territorial dispute from 
previous dynasties. The PRC claim referred to hundreds of thousands of square miles of the Soviet 
controlled territory which China complained was annexed by the Russian Empire through unfair 
treaties, which China had to sign during the Opium Wars as it was very weak.127 Although the Soviet 
Union did nullify many of these treaties signed by former “bourgeoisie” Russian government, there 
was little ability for China to hold talks with the USSR due to Chinese civil war.128 Only after 
Communist China consolidated power have the two countries dealt with the dispute before they 
managed to resolve final issues in July of 2008. The dispute over the border, covering 4,500 miles, 
passed periods of great tension and hostility, yet managed to be resolved, which is why it is worthy 
of study. It thus presents a dynamic where the two countries experienced both peaceful relations 
and internal, as well as external threats. Both countries are also great powers, with many resources 
at their disposal, and for that reason there is a natural control mechanism for confounding variables, 
such as economic dependency. Today, Russia and China enjoy a positive relationship, but 
understanding the nature of this dispute is vital, since the dispute itself played a key role in 
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exacerbating tensions between the two countries, and for a long time the dispute presented “one of 
the most explosive international boundaries in the world”.129 
6.1 Value of the Land 
The border dispute between Russia and China (excluding territorial disputes which non-
Russian Soviet Republics inherited) was primarily a problem over location of the boundary in the 
rivers, whether it ran along the deepest channels (Thalweg principle), one shore line or the other, or 
the middle of the river. Naturally, the dispute covered around seven hundred islands, including 
Damansky/Zhenbao Island and Bolshoy Ussuriysky/Heixiazi Island, two islands which proved to be 
very difficult to resolve. Regarding the salience of the land, Fravel rated it as 5 out of 12 points, thus 
belonging to low-medium category.130 However, Hensel and Mitchell ranked the salience of the Sino-
Soviet border only as 3 out of 12.131 The reasoning behind this rank is as follows. First, economically 
the islands have no natural resources. There are very few people living there to provide much of a 
farming value. The only limited economic value are the rivers which provide shipping access to the 
Pacific Ocean from the northern parts of Manchuria. Locally, however, Heixiazi (Bolshoy Ussuriysky) 
Island did provide drinking water for the second largest Russian city in the region and it has been a 
location for family gardens of its citizens.132 The most commonly cited value of the islands was its 
strategic location during the Sino-Soviet split, where having an upper hand over the control of the 
border was a way of containing the opponent.133 However, militarization of the border only has an 
endogenous value, as the border only gained strategic value due to Sino-Soviet split. Therefore, one 
can conclude that value of the disputed area has been fairly low to the Russian regime. 
6.2 Tracing the Negotiations 
From 1949 until 1960s, China and the Soviet Union had a positive, friendly relationship, and 
thus they chose to ignore that they even had a territorial dispute.134 Only in September of 1960 China 
finally approached the Soviet Union to hold talks over one sector of the disputed border in Central 
Asia due to 1956 confrontations over grazing areas northeast of the Boziaigeer Pass in Xinjiang’s 
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Atushi (Artux) Country.135 These confrontations resurfaced several times in the 1960 which increased 
the necessity to resolve the issue as soon as possible.136 On September 21 1960, the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry sent a diplomatic note to the Soviet Embassy in Beijing suggesting that the two sides 
negotiate over this sector. China at this time was facing ethnic instability in Tibet, and therefore it 
agreed to withdraw its herders from the area in order to minimize any future tensions.137 The Soviet 
Union responded by stating that no dispute existed, and it followed this stance until late 1963 when 
border clashes could no longer be ignored.138 Chinese cattle herders were crossing the border into 
the Soviet Union by thousands, allegedly by the order or encouragement of Chinese officials who 
intended to provoke the Soviets.139  
As soon as the Soviets acknowledged that the boundary was a problem after all, in April of 
1963, China moved to open comprehensive boundary talks while the relationship between the two 
communist states continued to deteriorate.140 For example, in response to border violations by 
China, Khrushchev remarked in December of 1962 that Hong Kong and Macao were remnants of 
colonialism that remained untouched on the Chinese territory.141 In March of 1963, the Chinese 
retaliated by publishing in People’s Daily editorial a discussion regarding unequal treaties in which 
the Qing had ceded vast tracts of land to tsarist Russia. Soviets saw this as a potential violation of 
past agreements between the two countries and Chinese attempts to reinitiate a dispute.142 In fact, 
subsequent Chinese policy of mass Chinese settlement in the disputed region proved that the Soviets 
were right.143 Chinese opened the dispute due to a deteriorating relationship with the USSR, and only 
by opening the dispute could China militarize the border without provoking a Soviet attack.144 
Despite this deteriorating relationship, Soviets accepted to hold talks, or more specifically, they were 
willing to engage in a limited discussion about specific problems on the border without 
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encompassing the entire boundary.145 The Chinese pressed for the entire border to be discussed, but 
the Soviets stuck to their stance. With these positions set, the two sides started negotiations on 
February 23 of 1964 in Beijing.  
1964 negotiations are considered the first mutual desire to try and solve at least some 
territorial disputes between the USSR and China. Many analysts claim that talks between the two 
sides deteriorated into polemics because the Soviets refused to acknowledge that the Qing dynasty 
signed unfair treaties, as the Chinese wanted to discuss discrepancies created by the implementation 
of those treaties.146 But even though they disagreed on questions of principle, the two sides 
exchanged maps and reached a verbal consensus on the eastern sector of the border.147 According to 
both Russian and Chinese sources, the draft of 1964 agreement was almost identical to the one 
reached in 1991.148 Russia gave most of the concessions in this agreement, allocating some 600 
square kilometers to China. Only two areas in the eastern sector were not resolved by this draft 
agreement, the Black Bear island (Heixiazi), where both sides disagreed on the direction of the main 
channel at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, and the Abagaitu Shoal, where changes in 
the direction of the Argun River created ambiguity over the location of the boundary.149 Despite the 
verbal agreement, Moscow did not initial this draft treaty because of the disagreement over these 
two islands that the USSR occupied.150 As well, the territorial dispute in the Western sector around 
the Pamirs was not resolved, even though China offered to accept Soviet control over the Pamir 
Mountains in exchange for two islands in the eastern sector.151 The talks finally collapsed by the 
summer of 1964, after Mao questioned the Soviet right to the Kuril Islands and Eastern Europe, 
which Moscow viewed with alarm, believing that China might be making sweeping territorial 
claims.152 The two sides agreed to take a temporary break and resume negotiations in Moscow on 
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October 15, but by then Khrushchev fell from power and negotiations never did resume.153 However, 
failure to resolve the border dispute led to the deployment of troops on both sides of the border.154 
By 1966 the Sino-Soviet split was at its worst, which led to a threefold increase in the number 
of troops deployed on both sides of the border.155 Incursions were frequent and the Chinese even 
opened fire on Soviet ships.156 Newly deployed Soviet divisions were ordered to rebuff any Chinese, 
even peasants, which attempted to land on the disputed islands,157 including the islands which were 
allocated to China based on the consensus reached in 1964. In 1967 Mao started urging the Chinese 
to increase their combat preparedness as part of critical preparations for an offensive attack.158 
Mao’s plan was to put pressure on the Soviets. As number of incidents increased involving the Soviet 
troops and Chinese citizens, the Chinese government began to increase its own number of armed 
patrols (which would subsequently ambush the Soviets).159 This move caused the USSR to block 
Chinese navigation to the north and east of the disputed Heixiazi Island. At the beginning of 1968, 
eighteen confrontations occurred over the Qiliqin Island. The Soviets were always superior in these 
incidents, which gave them the stronger claim strength.160 As the next winter came, freezing the 
rivers, China attempted to reassert its claim over islands on the Chinese side of the river, and in 
February of 1969 the Soviets responded by using live ammunition.161 On February 19, the Central 
Committee in China, GSD, and MFA approved the Heilongjiang MD plan, which instructed a Chinese 
surprise attack on the Soviet border troops on Zhenbao (Damansky) Island, in an attempt to teach 
the Soviets a “bitter lesson” about the dangers of armed confrontations over disputed areas.162 In 
March 1969, elite Chinese troops ambushed a Soviet patrol on the island, representing a drastic 
change in the Chinese policy of how to settle its border dispute with the Soviet Union. This violent 
move by China produced high tensions between the two states, including venomous verbal attacks 
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and even a Soviet threat to use its nuclear weapons.163 Luckily, a few months later, Zhou Enlai met 
with Premier Alexey Kosygin in Beijing and formal talks started, mostly to manage the crisis instead 
of solving it.164 Incidents continued throughout the 1970s while conflict management prevented any 
further escalation. 
 During the 1980s tensions between the two sides were managed due to a Sino-Soviet 
détente, although as a precaution both sides deployed nuclear weapons on their side of the border in 
response to incidents which continued until the 1985.165 Only after Gorbachev took unilateral steps 
to re-approach China, with the formula “close the past, open the future”166, China finally agreed to 
genuinely negotiate. First round of talks took place in February of 1987, when the two sides agreed 
to focus on the eastern sector, basing their negotiations on the 1964 consensus.167 By August, the 
two sides agreed to establish the median line as the river boundary. They also established a joint 
working group of experts who were to draft a boundary delimitation agreement.168 However, there 
was still some disagreement between the two sides. Namely, China wanted a comprehensive 
settlement of all disputed areas (which would increase its leverage over the complex disputes in the 
western sector), while the Soviet Union only wanted to discuss the eastern sector.169 Second round 
of talks was held in October of 1988 and an understanding was reached on most of the eastern 
sector of the border, which acknowledged prior agreements on river boundary.170 Where they failed 
to agree was the same issue as in 1964, namely the Heixiazi Island at the confluence of the Amur and 
Ussuri rivers, and Abagaitu Shoal in the Argun river. Soviets occupied these islands, but the Chinese 
maintained that both islands were on their side of the river. Apart from that, Soviet Union finally 
accepted to start discussions on the western sector, particularly the Pamir Mountains, and to 
conduct a joint aerial survey.171 Therefore, there was no major breakthrough, although the bilateral 
relationship between the two states began to improve in many other areas. 
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 Gorbachev visited Beijing in May of 1989 to normalize Soviet relations with China. It was an 
opportunity to sign the agreement based on the consensus reached in 1988, which was stalled due to 
the Chinese insistence to resolve all territorial issues, including the aforementioned islands. At the 
fourth round of negotiations in 1989, China finally dropped the demand for a comprehensive 
package settlement. Thus, China agreed to sign sector-specific deals, leaving the two islands under 
Soviet control to be discussed in the future.172 With the consensus reached, negotiators moved to 
sign the agreement. Then in June 1990, vice-foreign ministers decided to affirm existing areas of 
agreement in a legal document, a decision that produced the 1991 eastern sector agreement.173 It 
was officially on May 16, 1991 that Qian Qichen and Soviet foreign minister Alexander Bessmertnykh 
signed a boundary agreement for the eastern sector.174 The agreement established the deepest river 
channel as the official border in the east. Russia also conceded 700 islands and 1,500 hectares of land 
while China dropped further claims in Russia’s Far East region. This resolved 98% of the dispute.175 
 Even though the Soviet Union disintegrated, the agreement was ratified. Demarcation began 
in late 1991, and a demarcation commission was formed in June of 1992. The actual demarcation of 
the eastern sector started in 1993.176 A detailed delimitation of the border was finished in November 
of 1997.177 The reason why this process took several years was due to local opposition in Russia to 
the way border was demarcated.178 This required additional agreements for joint use of islands for 
farming. Some smaller islands also ended up being divided equally even though original agreement 
was supposed to have transferred these islands to China.179 Overall, the disputed territory was 
divided almost evenly between the two sides, with China receiving approximately 53% of the 
share.180 A minor dispute remained outside of the eastern sector, namely a stretch of land between 
Mongolia-Russia-China tripoint and the Kazakhstan-Russia-China tripoint (the ‘western sector’), 
comprising only a 55 km stretch.181 An agreement over this area was finalized during a series of 
meetings held by working groups in 1994.182 By September of 1994, Qian Qichen and Andrei Kozyrev 
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signed the western sector boundary agreement. Demarcation of this sector was completed in 
1999.183  
All that was left from the original dispute were the three islands which were stumbling points in 
history of Sino-Soviet border negotiations, namely the Heixiazi (Bolshoy Ussuriysky) Island, Yinlong 
(Tarabarov) Island and the Abagaitu Shoal, which remained disputed until Putin’s visit to China in 
October of 2004, despite protests by local Russians. This is when he and Jiang Zemin signed a 
supplemental boundary agreement for the eastern sector. In this document China and Russia agreed 
to divide the three islands equally.184 Russia gave Yinlong Island to China, and divided the other two 
equally.185 However, there are indicators that this decision to compromise was reached already in 
2002.186 
6.3 Changing Factors 
As mentioned, in 1964 the USSR and China managed to change the status-quo by reaching a 
verbal agreement on the eastern sector of the border. Although the two sides did not sign any 
documents, the important factor here is that the Soviet Union was willing to give up some of its 
territorial claims. The reasoning behind such cooperation can be found in the Soviet desire to 
establish friendly and cooperative relations with its neighbours, at the time when it faced serious 
nuclear threats from the United States. As my hypothesis would predict, the Soviet Union acted to 
gain international supporters while facing this particular threat. This was particularly important since 
China strained its relationship with the USSR by escalating the dispute, namely, by seeking to reclaim 
the territory that the Soviet Union occupied. This only furthered the Sino-Soviet rift. 
Shortly after, the two countries found themselves almost at war. Some sources state that it was 
the USSR who started the initial escalation due to the 1968 Brezhnev doctrine to intervene in the 
affairs of other socialist states.187 However, the evidence does not support this claim as the Brezhnev 
doctrine was declared in the context of the 1968 Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. 
However, Chinese believed it was also directed against them.188 They also believed that Soviet 
violations of China’s airspace and massing troops on the border were deliberate acts. Nonetheless, in 
1969 Chinese brought the conflict to the fore by attacking Soviet border troops, an action which can 
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be seen in the broader context of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, where the two sides since Stalin’s death 
began to differ on many policy issues, from economic policies to the Cuban missile crisis and the 
Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe.189 It was Mao’s goal to turn the tables against the Soviet Union 
by putting pressure on it, and a border dispute was a perfect ‘pawn’ to use in this strategic game.190 
For purposes of this research it is important to understand that what led the Soviet Union to 
escalate the conflict was its loss of territorial claim strength due to the Chinese policy of settling 
Chinese citizens in the border areas, as well as the American re-approachement with China. The 
Soviet Union thus felt that it needed a stronger bargaining position to preserve its claim, even risking 
a possible war.191 Yet interestingly it was the Soviet Union that was eager to negotiate, and when the 
Chinese refused, Soviets threatened an imminent military invasion deep into China to destroy 
nuclear weapons installations.192 Further evidence of the Soviet desire to cooperate is the offer to 
give in to some of the Chinese territorial claims.193 Evidence points out that these concessions were 
offered in order to improve the Sino-Soviet relations and to undermine improving US-China 
relations.194 Soviet offers continued throughout the 1970s.195  
This combination of escalation and cooperation is interesting for this theoretical framework. 
Escalation is explained by the tenets of the preventive war theory, namely that use of force occurs 
when the relative claim-strength of a state is declining (also when it coincides with an 
internal/external threat), as was the Soviet claim strength after it became challenged by the Chinese 
illegal immigrants. Why compromise occurred under the same conditions represents a carrot that the 
Chinese would receive for helping the Soviet Union consolidate its international position against the 
increasingly powerful US. Cooperative behaviour in response to a threat fits the theory of 
omnibalancing. However, the combination of cooperation and escalation at the same time is not 
predicted by my hypotheses, which presents a weakness of the theoretical framework used in this 
research. 
The re-approachment in the late 1980s can be understood as a consequence of Russia and China 
facing a lot of internal threats to their political stability.196 Gorbachev was first to recognize the need 
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to re-approach China in order to halt a decline in the Soviet international position.197 Thus, good 
relations with other socialist states became more important. Not surprisingly, he took the initiative to 
normalize relations, first in 1986 and then again in 1991. It was here that he unilaterally offered to 
reduce Soviet troops on the border with China.198 Of course, by 1991, not only did Russia face 
competition with the United States, but it also faced an economic collapse, which urged Gorbachev 
to end a second arms race with the United States.199 For this reason it was costly for the Soviet Union 
to maintain a territorial dispute with China by keeping 600,000 troops on the border. Gorbachev 
basically pressed to appease both China and the US and that way arrest Soviet Union’s declining 
international position.200  
In terms of progress on the border dispute, Gorbachev offered to follow ‘the mid-point’ at every 
location where a river was the border, which was a concession to previous Soviet claims that the 
border ran along the Chinese bank.201 Gorbachev was, in effect, accepting the 1964 consensus over 
the eastern sector. Gorbachev’s behaviour therefore fits well with the theory of omnibalancing, 
which stipulates that Russia would indeed compromise when it faced threats. Cooperation on border 
demarcation continued through the 1990s which culminated in the Russo-Chinese strategic 
partnership of 2001, termed “The Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation”, 
perhaps resembling a strategic alliance, as the purpose of such an alliance was to “stem support for a 
unipolar world with the United States as the only superpower”.202 As I mentioned in the theory 
section, a state declining in power will form coalitions to arrest its decline, and coalition with China, 
including the border settlement, can be seen in this context. Such a deal was favourable to China as 
well, since the American President George W. Bush labeled China as a “strategic competitor.”203 
Other internal threats also played a role in shaping Russia’s desire to finalize the territorial 
cooperation in 2004. The long land border with China is 4,250 kilometres long, and naturally it is very 
porous, especially to Chinese immigrants and their subsequent economic influence. Since the Russian 
Far East is sparsely populated, with steadily declining six million Russians, the number of Chinese 
living there (estimated to be from 200,000 to 450,000) could easily grow to several million.204 Thus, 
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Russia had an interest to solve the border issue with China before the ‘Sinofication’ problem gets 
bigger, which could implicate China’s leverage and renew the territorial dispute.205 This is why Putin 
pursued a quick resolution to the territorial dispute.206 In 2004 he gave away most of the territory on 
the three remaining disputed islands, which was allegedly done to ease China’s potential anger 
regarding Putin’s decision to build a pipeline to Japan (rather than China), but also to help persuade 
China to support Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization.207 Putin’s move proved to be 
beneficial, as bilateral relations between the two former adversaries further improved, including 
record amounts of trade and investment, military sales, joint research and development, and a 
common stance on many international issues.208 Thus, the incentive to cooperate was not only due 
to internal threats that Russia faced, but also the potential ones. In this way, my theoretical 
framework can be expanded to include both potential and existing threats. 
6.4 Alternative Theories 
Alternative theories have a rather limited explanatory power in this dispute as well. First, for 
ideational theories, analysis of democracies does not apply to Russia, as Russian democracy is seen 
as being semi-authoritarian. Although Yeltsin did compromise during a brief democratization period, 
the Soviet Union also compromised in 1964, when it was nowhere near democratic ideals. Similarly, 
analyzing alliances in this territorial conflict is also invalid since Russia and China, even as initial 
communist partners, very quickly became rivals. As for the presence of a norm against conquest that 
would make states more likely to offer concessions or pursue a status-quo, such a norm would be 
difficult to defend when China and the Soviet Union experienced many episodes of escalation. 
Furthermore, economic interdependence and a desire to increase trade or investment did not 
prevent the two countries from escalating in the 1960s when they needed to recover their 
economies and one way of doing that could have been through economic cooperation.209 As such, 
economic interdependence might only apply when two countries have removed all obstacles to such 
a relationship. This has happened with Putin’s finalization of the territorial dispute with China by 
offering concessions on the three remaining islands. His incentive was to secure the border against 
illegal Chinese immigrants but also to improve the bilateral relationship between the two states and 
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thereby reduce any potential tensions.210 Therefore, economic interdependence only has a limited 
explanatory power. 
In the realist camp there is the argument that states should be most likely to use force 
because they can seize disputed land at an acceptable cost or impose a favourable settlement on 
their adversary. This argument continues that a state will also use force in a territorial dispute not 
because of the importance of the land being contested but because of the need to invest in a general 
reputation for toughness, as well as to challenge a rival. These arguments can explain one occasion, 
and that is the Soviet escalation during the 1960s when the US and China established better 
relations. The Soviet Union used force during this episode to reaffirm its claim strength and to force 
China to negotiate since China sought to maintain the tensions by conducting a policy of conscious 
and systematic violations of the frontier between the two countries.211 Of course, the Chinese motive 
to bring up the territorial dispute reflected difficult bilateral relations.212 These difficult relations 
began at the end of the 1950s with Sino-Soviet disagreements over several issues: their military 
strategy and cooperation, détente with the US, economic models, and other issues.213 In fact, 
previous research shows evidence that the Chinese never intended to resolve the dispute as a 
separate issue, but rather to put pressure on the Soviet Union.214 As such, the rivalry argument 
seems to hold some validity. However, even as rivals, the Soviets were offering to concede some of 
their territory to China while also applying pressure, indicating that the rivalry cannot explain why 
one strategy would be used over the other. Even rivals apply different strategies. 
Finally, the neo-classical realist camp would argue that as territorial disputes are among core 
interests of a state, they provide an issue over which leaders may rally a society to achieve other 
goals. There is some evidence that China may have played this card.215 The Soviet leaders also may 
have occasionally used the border dispute to gain domestic support, but such evidence is lacking. 
Moreover, if the USSR had initiated the border dispute with China to gain domestic support, 
shouldn’t it have done so at time of its greatest need to rally the domestic society, namely, during 
the collapse of the USSR? Yet it is precisely at this time that most cooperation occurred, when the 
risk of an internal coup was the greatest. As well, shouldn’t a state rally the society around disputes 
which it is likely to win, thus please the society, not around difficult disputes such as this? Evidence 
for this argument is difficult to find. 
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7 Mixed Results with the Baltic States 
 
The term ‘Baltic States’ commonly refers to modern-day Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. These 
three republics gained independence as modern nation-states in the aftermath of World War I. As 
newly established states, they concluded peace and border treaties with the Soviet Russia in 1920. 
However, in World War II, significant changes to the borders took place after these three states were 
occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union. Certain changes favoured the Russian SFSR, which has 
become the source of political tensions after the dissolution of the USSR.216 Particularly, Estonian and 
Latvian governments raised the question of their borders, while Lithuania has not (since it has gained 
a lot of territory from Poland). Thus, the focus here will be on the former, with a particular focus on 
Estonian-Russian dispute as it is the unresolved dispute of the two. Even with partial success, the 
region has been relatively free from clashing territorial interests.217 The Baltic case is significant for 
this research because it presents a form of a least-likely test. Namely, the power difference between 
Russia and these states is vast; Russia would have no trouble maintaining or increasing its claim 
strength, if it wanted to, since the Baltic States have little leverage to threaten Russia. Secondly, this 
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case presents two very similar states that ended up with a different outcome in the territorial dispute 
with Russia, yet neither entailed Russian compromise over the territory. It is thus interesting to 
discover the reasons behind such a difference. 
7.1 Value of the Land 
 Alexander Sergouning has assessed that this territorial issue is not very important, although it 
can be a source of dangerous tensions.218 The land claimed by Estonia is very small and is mostly 
populated by Russians, although there is a small Setu minority. There is one railway junction, as well 
a famous monastery in the area.219 Whatever agriculture used to be there, it has mostly fallen apart, 
and enterprises are underdeveloped. Many villages are empty, except for the elderly people. 
Infrastructure is poor, and unemployment high.220 This is perhaps the clearest reason why the 
Estonians have changed their original stance from incorporating this area back into Estonia to leaving 
it with Russia. It would be economically costly to incorporate it, and it would only invite more Russian 
immigrants.  
As for the Aberne/Pytalovo area, which Latvia claimed, it is also small as it contains 20,000 
people, mostly rural-based elderly. The area itself also lacks industry. However, the principal reason 
for the Soviet interest in this territory was Aberne’s close connection to the Estonian Petseri district, 
and the role these areas played in Estonia and Latvia’s contingency plans for the initial defense 
against any Soviet invasion.221 In other words, its value was somewhat strategic, by denying the 
opponent any advantage it may want to use. Of course, one can also add the symbolic value of the 
land. Namely, in the Russian historiography, the Western borders of Russia, including the Baltic rim, 
are referred to as the “old Russian land”, or “our west”.222 However, the symbolic value has tended 
not to be emphasized compared to other disputed territories, and for this reason I assume a 
relatively low value of this disputed land. 
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7.2 Tracing the Negotiations 
7.2.1 Estonia 
 As the World War II was coming to an end, the Soviet Union occupied and annexed Estonia in 
1940, moving the boundary between Russian and Estonian Soviet Republics in the north of Lake 
Peipus 12 kilometers westward, situating it along the Narva River. The boundary south of the Lake 
Peipus was also moved westward, although by 25 kilometers, while the boundary that used to run in 
the middle of Lake Peipus remained the same. Overall, 2000 km² changed hands, including the 
following locations: Ivangorod (Jaanilinn), Pechory (Petseri), areas around Izborsk (Irboska), Lavry 
(Laura), and Rotovo (Roodva), as well as the island Kilpino (Kulkina). This area then became part of 
the Russian Pskov oblast.223 The rationale behind these border changes was to include Russian-
populated areas within Russia and the Baltic people into the Baltic States (as was done with 
Lithuania). 
 The territorial dispute with Estonia stemmed from the fact that Estonia, in its constitution, 
only recognized the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 as a valid border treaty between Estonia and 
Russia.224 Estonian stance became visible already in 1991 when Estonia pleaded its case under 
international law to have the interwar borders restored.225 During the same time Russia and Estonia 
signed the Basic Principles of Mutual Relationship. Not to be mistaken, the relationship between the 
two countries was rather chilly and in July of 1992 Estonian government issued a statement calling on 
Russia to withdraw her border guards back to the boundary established in the Tartu Peace Treaty of 
1920. Russia retaliated by threatening economic sanctions but agreed to engage in talks. However, 
after one year of bilateral talks produced no solutions, Russia acted unilaterally by fixing the 
borderline.226 It started the demarcation operation under directives of the President Yeltsin, who 
visited the border and declared that not a single inch of the Russian land will be given away. The 
Estonian government protested and hopelessly appealed to international organizations such as the 
OSCE for help. This naturally hampered Russian-Estonian relations.227  
However, change of government in Estonia occurred in the late 1994, when under the 
leadership of Prime Ministers Andres Tarand and Tiit Vahi, an agreement with Russia was sought. 
This led to an informal agreement in 1995 that there are no territorial claims and that the current 
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border will be preserved. However, there was no agreement on principles upon which this 
agreement was based. Namely, the Estonians stressed that the Tartu Peace Treaty’s legal value 
should be the starting point for negotiations; Russians did not recognize the legal value of that treaty. 
From the Russian perspective, its position only made sense, as recognizing this old treaty would leave 
doors open for subsequent claims of damages caused by the occupation, and this would also 
implicate the question of minorities. Russian fears later came true with Latvia. 
 However, from 1996 onward Estonia softened up. When Foreign Ministers Yevgeniy 
Primakov and Siim Kallas met in Petrozavodsk, the two parties announced that they were close to 
solving the dispute, as Estonia was more willing to drop its claim and any references to the Tartu 
Treaty.228 The proposed border itself differed only slightly from the de facto border (as there were 
some inconsistencies in the respective maps of the parties) but this was not seen as a problem for 
Russia.229 However, Russia did surprise everyone by refusing to sign any agreement without including 
the question of the Russian minorities.230 Despite this initial refusal, Russo-Estonian border treaty 
was signed in Moscow on 18 of May, 2004, followed by ratification in Estonia, but not in Russia. The 
reason behind Russia’s reluctance to ratify the treaty is that Estonia’s internal treaty ratification 
legislation passed by the parliament mentioned the Treaty of Tartu. The Treaty of Tartu affected 
historical legitimacy of the USSR because it specified that the USSR “occupied” the Baltic States.231 
Soon after, on September 2004, Russia withdrew her signature from the ‘Treaty between the Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Estonia on the Russian-Estonian State Border’.232 This border dispute 
has not gained much attention since then. 
7.2.2 Latvia 
 Just like Estonia, the Latvian Soviet Republic also lost 1300 km² of land in the northeast of the 
country to the Russian Soviet Republic, which contains one town of Pytalovo (Aberne) and six rural 
districts – Kacenu, Upmales, Linavas, Purvmalas, Ugspils, and Gauru.233 Shortly after the break-up of 
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the USSR, in 1992, the Latvian Supreme Council adopted a resolution “on the non-recognition of the 
annexation of the town of Abrene and its six oblasts.” This was in reference to the 1920 Riga Peace 
Treaty with Russia. The Russian government officially rejected the Latvian resolution.234 However, a 
year later the two sides signed an agreement on cross-border movement. Shortly after that, Latvian 
foreign minister, Valdis Birkavs, advocated rapprochement with Russia by introducing a temporary 
borderline until a permanent solution is found.235 Already in 1997 the two parties have drawn up a 
draft treaty on the border location.236 Such rapid success is partially explained because the Latvian 
government coordinated its policy with Estonia on their territorial dispute with Russia, which 
effectively meant that Latvia would follow Estonia in giving up its claim.  
Expectations were that the draft treaty would be signed in 2005. However, the Latvian 
opposition (led by Abrenian Union) lobbied for nationwide referendum on this treaty. Latvian 
government ruled out the referendum, and instead issued a declaration stating that Latvia was 
occupied by the USSR and that it requires material compensation for duration of the occupation 
period. Russia suspended the treaty in response, with Vladimir Putin declaring that Latvian behaviour 
defies modern European spirit.237 However, on March 2007, after the Latvian parliament approved 
the treaty and dropped references to the occupation period, the two sides managed to reconcile and 
sign an agreement on the location of the border, which has not changed.238 The Russian response to 
the agreement has been positive but reserved. 
7.3 Changing Factors 
7.3.1 Estonia 
Relations between post-communist Estonia and Russia started with strong rhetorical accusations. 
Disagreements over the border led Russians to unilaterally demarcate the border in 1994, so one can 
say that the Russians attempted to increase their claim strength in face of Estonian rhetorical 
escalation. The Estonians responded that the Russian move was a technical equivalent of war.239 This 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Island, 22; Levinsson, "The Long Shadow of History: Post-Soviet Border Disputes—the Case of Estonia, Latvia, 
and Russia," 101. 
234
 Levinsson, "The Long Shadow of History: Post-Soviet Border Disputes—the Case of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Russia," 105. 
235
 D. Bungs, "Seeking Solution to Baltic-Russian Border Issues," ed. RFE/RL Research Report 3:13 (1 April 1994), 
25. 
236
 Laura Sheeter, "Latvia, Russia Sign Border Deal," BBC News 27 March 2007. 
237
 Territorial Disputes of Russia, Including: Kuril Islands Dispute, Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, Karelian Question 
in Finnish Politics, Territorial Changes of the Baltic States, Sixty-Four Villages East of the River, Sarych, Tuzla 
Island, 24. 
238
 Russia Today, "Latvia Agrees to End Border Dispute with Russia," (08 February 2007). 
239
 Hedegaard, Lindström, and Lindstrom, The Nebi Yearbook: North European and Baltic Sea Integration, 440. 
52 
 
way Estonia sought to keep up in maintaining its own claim strength. Some of the Estonian protests 
have been rather dramatic, but Russia has maintained that the Tartu Peace Treaty is not in force, and 
that Estonians are showing an unjustified hostility towards Russia. What Estonian protests show is 
that Estonia had little physical leverage over Russia, which is why it attempted to assert international 
pressure onto its bigger neighbour. Therefore, from the perspective of my theoretical premises, this 
episode can only be understood as Russian escalation in face of Estonian attempts to re-claim the 
disputed land. The theory of preventive warfare is thus confirmed. Yet the theory of omnibalancing 
stipulates that a state will not cooperate while a) losing claim strength and b) facing internal or 
external threats. Since Russia was in the midst of a possible civil war and economic chaos, it can be 
understood from the theory of omnibalancing that Russia believed Estonia was trying to exploit its 
weakness, and therefore no cooperation occurred. 
Once the new government in Estonia chose to cooperate, the two parties managed to agree on 
the border but the debate was much more complex. Russia continued insisting that the present 
borders between Russia and the Baltic States are inviolable, despite the fact that millions of ethnic 
Russians live in Estonia and Latvia. So even though it could have, Russia did not increase its claim, 
because it faced a war in Chechnya and thus there was an internal threat which would have 
escalated had Russia conceded territory to Estonia (Chechen separatists could use the Estonian case 
as a precedent). So the outcome here is a perverse logic of my theoretical framework. Namely, when 
facing an internal threat, Russia desired to cooperate, but not by changing borders, as this would 
have exacerbated the internal threat. In this way, logic of the theory of omnibalancing fails.  
Later phases of negotiation, when Estonia cooperated and success seemed most likely, caused a 
surprise because Russia withdrew her signature. Thus, cooperation suddenly failed. Such behaviour 
only increased the Baltic States’ beliefs that Russia is using Russophone minorities and the border 
dispute as tools of Russia’s ‘neoimperial aims’. Namely, as soon as Estonia chose to cooperate, Russia 
began protesting over the treatment of Russians inside of Estonia and Latvia, not over the territorial 
claims.240 Even once they overcame this issue, Russia’s main protest shifted to the Estonian validation 
of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920. Specifically, Russia objected to the preamble which was presented 
to the Estonian parliament for the ratification of the agreement because it made reference to the 
legal continuity of the Estonian state proclaimed in the 1918 and its constitution (which are based on 
the Tartu Peace Treaty).241 Therefore, Russian behaviour was indeed unpredictable. Jääts has 
concluded his reasoning behind Russia’s reluctance as follows, “the Russian side is attempting to tie 
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the signing of the border treaty to the larger issue concerning the rights of the Russian-speaking 
population in Estonia, and has been delaying signing the treaty, referring to technical issues.”242 Thus, 
where Estonian fears were correct was that Russia indeed was only using the territorial dispute for 
other purposes.  
However, linking different issues is a common practice in diplomacy and it is wrong to believe 
that this was aimed only against Estonia. By stalling in whatever way possible, Russia was fighting a 
greater geopolitical game, namely attempting to prevent NATO expansion into the Baltic region.243 
This is not to say that the Russian minorities did not matter, but simply that the border dispute, 
minorities’ question, or any other issue mattered less than other strategic objectives such as NATO 
expansion. Levinsson correctly observes that “Russia has postponed ratification of the agreement… 
until other contested issues…. are resolved”.244 I do not go into depth why states preserve status-
quo, but it seems from the perspective of the theory of omnibalancing that when Russia faced NATO 
expansion (and other issues it deemed important) we ought to have seen cooperation with Estonia, 
in order to gain support for its position against NATO. Yet Russia did not compromise. Instead, it only 
sought to irritate Estonia further, hoping that NATO would back off. It did not work, and again, the 
logic of the theory of omnibalancing fails, unless of course, one considers this instance as falling 
outside the scope of the theory because Estonia had nothing to offer to Russia in return for a stable 
border. However, it would hardly be the case that Estonia could not offer anything to Russia, as other 
Baltic states faced similar issues as Estonia, yet managed to solve the border dispute with Russia. 
Either way, Russia never had to give up any of its claimed land to Estonia, nor was its claim ever 
threatened, and for this reason it actually remains surprising that Russia never offered some land to 
Estonia in return for some Estonian support, as my theoretical framework would predict. 
7.3.2 Latvia 
Despite the success of signing and ratifying a border treaty with Latvia, Russia has remained 
rather cautious towards Latvia, stating that the Latvian government must step up to solve the issue 
of Russian ethnic minorities.245 The reason then why Russia changed from a status-quo strategy to 
resolving the dispute with Latvia can be understood in what Levinsson observes to be the Russian 
desire to have its western borders officially recognized, in order to achieve visa freedom for its 
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citizens travelling within the EU.246 In addition to that, the EU has urged Russia to solve its territorial 
disputes with the Baltic States.247 Since the Russian claim strength was growing and/or remaining 
stable, my theoretical framework would predict compromise. Russia did compromise, but only to 
resolve the dispute. It actually did not have to give up any of the disputed territory. For this reason 
the case of Latvia, just like with Estonia, is simply a continuation of the status-quo. Opportunities for 
cooperation did exist, such as the time when Russia faced many internal problems or the NATO 
expansion, but interestingly, it was during those times that Russia was least willing to cooperate. For 
this reason, the theory of omnibalancing remains weak in this case, although as mentioned, due to 
influence of the EU and NATO on the Baltic States, this case is the least-likely case to fit the theory. 
7.4 Alternative Theories 
Alternative theories have some stronger validity in this case as this is the least-likely test and has 
stronger confounding variables. Once again, the democratic peace theory does not apply. However, 
the fact that each side had domestic opponents (who were not jailed) meant that any agreement had 
to take into account such opposition. As Moshes and Vushkarnik stated, even if the agreement 
between Russia and the Baltic states was signed, it would have probably not been ratified.248 Their 
prediction failed, but only because the EU and NATO played a strong role in pushing for border 
disputes to be resolved, yet another confounding variable which could relate to ‘norms’.249 
Mechanisms of alliance also do not apply; however, Latvia’s congruence with Estonian decisions 
reflects some level of a strategic partnership. Their special relationship therefore must be taken into 
equation. Next, economic interdependence of the Baltic States with Russia certainly was an 
important factor for them to seek the EU and NATO membership, thus to move away from 
dependence on Russia.  
All these alternative theories seem to have affected the Baltic States, but since my focus is on 
Russia, I find realist approaches more applicable as alternatives. Namely, as I discovered, given the 
Russian preoccupation with the NATO expansion at its borders, rivalry seems to have some validity in 
Russian calculations how to deal with this territorial dispute. In this way, Russian pressure on Latvia 
and Estonia can be compared to Khrushchev’s pressure on Japan when he unilaterally revised the 
Joint Declaration in response to a revision of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Cooperation and Security. 
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Finally, Boris Yeltsin’s negative reaction to Estonia’s demand that Russia withdraw its border guards 
demonstrates that Boris was at that time also trying to consolidate his power base at home, 
therefore, using the border issue to rally domestic nationalist support. 
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8 Russo-Ukrainian Dispute over the Tuzla Island 
8.1 Value of the Land 
 The Island of Tuzla refers to a spit island, a sandy islet of approximately 27,865 hectares in 
the middle of the Strait of Kerch between the Crimean Kerch Peninsula in the west and the Taman 
Peninsula in the east. It used to be part of the Taman peninsula, but due to a major storm in 1925, 
the spit was split, forming the island. The importance of the area is that it is a key shipping gateway 
between the Azov Sea and the Black Sea, having rich fishing resources as well. The Russian 
delegation, during negotiations in 2007, stated that 70% of all cargo shipments were made in Russia’s 
interests across the Kerch Strait.250 According to other experts, the importance of the Russo-
Ukrainian land and sea border delimitation can be understood through importance of the Azov Sea’s 
potential natural resources, as there are more than 100 oil and natural gas deposits discovered at the 
bottom of the sea.251 Strategically, however, the strait is also important for the Russian fleet 
travelling through the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Overall, my judgement is that the island has 
medium value for Russia, mostly in terms of sea resources and its strategic location. 
8.2 Tracing the Negotiations 
As for the source of the dispute, in 1941, the USSR transferred the island to the Crimean 
Oblast, which in 1954 became part of the Ukrainian SSR.252 When the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine 
established a maritime border with Russia based on the Soviet-era administrative border between 
the two republics. In other words, Ukraine claimed ownership over the island. According to reports, 
however, Russia has denied the existence of Soviet administrative borders along the internal sea area 
and called for a shared use of the Kerch Strait.253 The two sides did sign an accord in 1994, declaring 
that any construction or development in the Kerch region was to be approved by both sides. 
However, the issue exploded into diplomatic conflict when Russia started construction of a dike from 
the Taman Peninsula to the Tuzla Island in 2003.254 Ukraine then accused Russia of encroaching on its 
territory, fearing that it would lose authority over the Kerch straight which runs from the Sea of Azov 
to the Black Sea, and on to Turkey and the Mediterranean. The Russian response was that Tuzla was 
once a spit from the Russian mainland which ought to be rebuilt to protect coastal farms and 
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beaches.255 Fearing loss of its position, Ukraine threatened to seek international arbitration if no 
agreement was reached, and it immediately deployed its troops to the island. However, Russia 
suspended the dam project while Ukraine agreed to withdraw its troops from the Tuzla Island. Two 
sides then created an agreement on cooperation in the use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Straight, 
stating that sea areas are historically internal waters of both Russia and Ukraine and that the area 
will be shared between them.256 
 Negotiations did take place, and by 2005, a third round was complete, with Russia declaring 
recognition of Ukraine’s ownership of the Tuzla Island.257 Specifically during this round, the two sides 
discussed the issue of demarcation of the Azov Sea and the Black Sea. Russia insisted on demarcating 
lines on the sea floor of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait, but Ukraine preferred to draw the border 
line on the water surface, as is the practice in international law.258 In 2007, Russia stated that it was 
determined to work with Ukraine to resolve the dispute, but that the issue is advancing slowly and 
will not be delimited quickly and easily. Russia also accused Ukraine of unilaterally establishing the 
border in 1999.259 Ukrainian President Yushchenko during his mandate said that Ukraine was willing 
to resolve the Kerch Strait issue if Moscow recognized the Soviet-era administrative borderline as the 
state border. Ukraine also proposed changing the status of the Azov Sea from territorial to 
international waters, but Russia said this violated the 2003 agreement.260 Overall, Ukraine simply 
wants a clear division of the territory/sea in accordance to the international regulations, while Russia 
wants a shared use because then it can get access to the Ukrainian side, where fish and oil seem to 
be more abundant. Ukraine is ready to collaborate on many issues with Russia, such as the 
environment and defense, but only after the border is clearly established. 
 In 2010, the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, during the meeting with the speaker at 
the Russian Federation Council, stated that there are discussions on the issue, but proposals don’t 
meet interests of either side.261 For Ukraine, resolution of this issue is important for visa-free travel 
of Ukrainians into the EU. A year later, signs of tensions resurfaced when Ukraine, for the first time, 
demanded a fee for the passage of Russian Black Sea Fleet.262 Despite the ongoing dispute of the 
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territory, there has been an agreement signed to create a natural park and a monastery on the 
island.263 
8.3 Changing Factors 
 As the issue was only really brought to the fore in 2003, to test the theory, one has to 
understand why Russia changed its status-quo strategy at that moment and not earlier or later. First, 
as the political analyst Jan Maksymiuk explains, Russian plans of dam construction are only an 
episode of a bigger political issue, namely the delimitation of the sea border between Ukraine and 
Russia, whereby Russia wants the leave the Azov Sea for joint use, while Ukraine wants a clear 
division (as joint use would give Russia greater access to resources such as oil).264 However, Russia 
also escalated the issue because Ukraine imposed duties on the Russian ships travelling through the 
strait.265 Second, the escalation itself was initiated most likely by local Russian officials hoping to 
build a direct road link to Crimea.266 Nonetheless, the Kremlin immediately took the responsibility as 
there are a lot of stakes for Russia in the dispute. Therefore, it may very likely be that Russia took 
over the issue and then intentionally stalled in order to gain concessions in others areas, particularly 
to achieve joint use of the Sea of Azov.267 This is further supported by the fact that Russia escalated 
the issue in 2003 at the time when pro-Western forces in Ukraine condemned the creation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States.268 Russia has always been opposed to strong Western 
influence in Ukraine, considered a cradle of the Russian nation. In other words, Russia has used the 
dispute over the Tuzla Island to achieve either shared use of the Sea of Azov or to maintain an upper 
hand over the Western influences there. All this points out towards a simple conclusion, namely that 
Russia escalated the issue and kept it at the forefront because Russia desired concessions in other 
areas. This rejects my hypothesis on escalation, which would stipulate that Russia would only 
escalate if it was losing the claim (or facing a threat while also losing a claim). Russia has not been 
losing the claim any more in 2003 than in 1999 when Ukraine unilaterally demarcated the border. In 
fact, in 2004-05, when pro-Western forces took power in the Ukraine, Russia should have felt even 
more threatened, but at that time, it only preserved the status quo. The theory of preventive 
warfare, in other words, fails to explain the case of this escalation. Up to today, the issue remains 
unresolved. 
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8.4 Alternative Theories 
 Alternative theories can apply as follows. Using a dispute for rallying of domestic support has 
some explanatory power as Putin faced elections in the early 2004, thus, appearing tough and 
nationalistic has helped him secure more votes, particularly because launching territorial claims over 
Tuzla is not a very risky strategy, as the island is very small.269 Theories on rivalry also have some 
support, as the Western expansion of its influence into Ukraine, especially through the NATO and 
Orange revolution, played an important role for Russia as Russia took into account Ukraine’s western 
trajectory. Namely, the NATO has always supported Ukraine on this issue.270 Other alternative 
explanations lack supportive evidence. For example, economic interdependence did not prevent 
escalation, nor did it encourage cooperation in this case. Russia is utilizing its relative strength to try 
and coerce Ukraine, but its relative capability is rather limited, as Russia was willing to back down in 
2003 after Ukraine deployed its military forces to the Tuzla Island. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
269
 Ibid. 
270
 "2003: The Year in Review: A Tiny Island in the News: The Dispute over Tuzla," The Ukrainian Weekly LXII, 
no. 2 (January 11, 2004). 
60 
 
9 Soviet-Turkish-Iranian Territorial Claims 
9.1 Value of the Land 
Soviet relations with Turkey and Iran are an important case study which resulted in the Russian 
cooperation, and therefore, these cases compose an important test of the hypotheses on 
cooperation, namely, the expectation is that Russia should have faced internal threats when it chose 
to cooperate. The lands in these cases were historically of great economic and strategic importance 
both to the USSR and the West, including the use of rivers, and oil wells of Baku. As a matter of fact, 
Western colonies and empires have always worked to deny Russia access to these rich southern 
areas.271 For this reason, these cases should demonstrate particularly easy test case of the Soviet 
reluctance to cooperate. However, cooperation did occur on many occasions, and therefore, it is 
important to analyze why. 
9.2 Tracing the Negotiations 
9.2.1 Turkey 
As far as Turkey is concerned, Bolsheviks renounced all interests in Turkey already in 1917. In 
1921, an agreement was signed between the Soviet regime and Turkey in Moscow. The Soviet Union 
surrendered Tsarist claims, as well as the outstanding 1877-78 war indemnity from Turkey, and 
agreed to return to Turkey the provinces of Ardahan and Kars, parts of Russia from 1878 to 1918, and 
it also allowed Turkey free use of the port of Batum.272 Soon afterward, in 1925, the USSR and Turkey 
signed a treaty of neutrality and non-aggression, which led to final demarcation of their frontier in 
1926. These compromises were made at the time when the Soviet Russia was still battling remains of 
the Tzarist influence, and therefore, it was highly vulnerable. It is then safe to conclude that the 
Soviet behaviour is strongly in line with our predictions on cooperation. 
Nonetheless, in mid 1930s, the relationship between the two states started deteriorating as the 
USSR demanded that Turkey sign a protocol to the effect of closing the Dardanelles to all non-Black 
Sea countries. The Soviet argument was that these seaways had been used by the Western powers to 
attack Russia’s southern flank, which was significant as by 1939 Germany had already established 
itself in the Balkans. As soon as the Second World War was over, in 1945, Stalin denounced the 1921 
treaty, instead re-installing pre-1921 Tsarist claims.273 These claims included a large section of the 
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Turkish territory, which included former parts of the Russian Empire but also additional territory. A 
year later, the Soviet Government demanded USSR’s association in the defence of the straits as the 
basis for a proposal for a fresh treaty in the place of one denounced. However, Turkey rejected these 
proposals.274 Yet in 1953, a year after Turkey joined the NATO, Soviet Union dropped its claims in 
Turkey. Commonly it is understood that these claims were dropped due to the Soviet competition 
with the United States, and therefore disputes with Turkey became more costly to pursue.275 Facing a 
strong external threat, the Soviet cooperation is clearly in line with the theory of omnibalancing. 
Interestingly, Russia decided to cooperate and give up territorial claims on the land which is very 
valuable. 
9.2.2 Iran 
As for the analysis on the Soviet-Iranian border dispute, I have to go back to the First World War, 
when Persia was greatly irritated by foreigners fighting battles on its soil. In 1919, at the Peace 
Conference, Persia claimed parts of the Caucasus including Erevan, Derbent, Baku, Tekes territory, 
Marv, and Khiva within her boundaries.276 However, the Soviet Union in 1921 signed a treaty of 
friendship with Persia in Moscow, by which the Soviet Russia abandoned all ‘imperialistic 
encroachments’ and financial advantages in Persia, and it also re-established the Russo-Persian 
boundary according to the 1881 treaty line. The Russians also renounced their claim to the island of 
Ashurada in the south Caspian and returned the frontier town of Firuza to Persia.277 In 1926 they also 
signed a treaty on utilization of the frontier rivers and waters from the Hari Rud to the Caspian Sea. 
In 1927 the two parties agreed to appoint five frontier commissioners to prevent any frontier 
incidents from occurring along the entire common border. Just like with the case of Turkey, young 
and vulnerable Soviet regime seemed to have been signing treaties with many of its disputants, 
including Iran, which presents further evidence in support of my hypothesis on cooperation. 
Despite this early cooperation, during the World War II, Iran was occupied due to the British-
Iranian-Soviet tripartite Treaty, and the Soviet Union established an autonomous republic in the 
northwestern Iran.278 However, in 1954 the Soviet Union agreed to demarcate the border with Iran, 
making boundary changes in Iran’s favor.279 In May of 1957, Iran and the USSR agreed in principle to 
sign a boundary agreement for settling the many border disputes in the Bojnurd area over questions 
of border crossing, pasturage, etc. A few months later, they also concluded an eleven article treaty in 
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Teheran on the joint utilization of the fifty per cent of all water and power resources of the frontier 
rivers Aras and Atrak.280 In 1970, a supplementary protocol was signed in Moscow to clarify the 
boundary along the water reservoirs. Overall, just like with Turkey, the Soviet Union in 1950s seemed 
determined to clear any costly territorial disputes as it faced competition with the United States.281 
At such a time, Iran was an important player that the USSR attempted to bring into its own orbit of 
influence, however, even with such attempts, Iran signed a bilateral defence agreement with the US, 
effectively deeply straining its relationship with the Soviets. Yet even then, no territorial disputes 
were re-established.282 
9.3 Alternative Explanations 
Among the alternative explanations which have some validity in these two cases, only the rivalry 
theory has some support. Namely, many decisions which the Soviet Union made in regards to Turkey 
and Iran were based on the Soviet rivalry with the United States. However, even with rivalry in mind, 
the Soviet Union did not pursue only one strategy. Fravel correctly pointed out that even rivals adapt 
different strategies. In this case, the Soviet Union cooperated, and cooperation fits in with the theory 
of omnibalancing. However, the rivalry only applies to post-WWII cooperation. During the early 
cooperation, namely after the First World War, there was no rivalry, and Soviet cooperation at that 
time was equally relevant, and can only be explained by numerous threats that the early Soviet 
regime faced: international support for the Tsarist regime and the civil war itself. All other alternative 
theories face numerous counter-evidence or they do not apply at all, such as the democratic peace 
theory or the theory on cooperation between alliance members. 
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10 Russian and Kazakh Border Agreement 
10.1 Value of the Land 
Russia’s land border with Kazakhstan is 7,500 kilometres long, the second longest border in the 
world. Areas of northern Kazakhstan, populated by ethnic Russians, contain some valuable resources 
such as major coal deposits, gold, and hydro plants. The area is also heavily used for agriculture.283 
Although Russia already contains a vast territory of its own unexploited resources, there is a high 
resource value in this area compared to the other disputed cases in this research. Also, as the area is 
populated by the ethnic Russians, who form the majority of population in the north of the country, 
there is the ethno-cultural value of the land, as long as the population remains there. Overall, one 
can give medium importance to the land bordering Russia and Kazakhstan. 
10.2 Tracing the Negotiations 
Shortly after the Soviet Union disintegrated, in 1991, Kazakh president insisted on expanding the 
CIS to include all members of the former Soviet Union.284 A few months later, Russia rewarded 
Kazakhstan’s stance during the signing of bilateral treaties on economic co-operation. Namely, 
Kazakhstan was given a clause guaranteeing its territorial integrity. This was Russian 
acknowledgement that no dispute existed between the two neighbours. This might be considered an 
irrelevant case for this study, but as Stephen Page states, this was not an insignificant reward for 
Kazakhstan, where a large concentration of Russians in the north of Kazakhstan presented a 
significant force.285 In 1992, the Treaty on Collective Security was signed by Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. In 2002 the two sides began working together to 
clarify disputed areas of the border.286 Finally, in 2007, the actual demarcation of the border began, 
which will take about 10 to 15 years. 
10.3 Changing Factors 
It was in Moscow’s best interest to deal with the potential causes of conflict before they 
escalate. The threat from Kazakhstan was a psychological one, fearing potential immigration and 
economic encroachment. After all, Kazakhstan was an economic burden for Russia, and thus Russia 
actually wanted a greater level of separation while Kazakhstan desired greater integration.287 For this 
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reason, Russia needed Kazakhstan as a friendly or a neutral power, but distant enough not to be a 
burden. Kimura believes that in 2004 and 2005, the matter to demarcate the border was urgent for 
Putin.288 This is unlike Japan, which has not presented any threat to Russia. Therefore, border 
demarcation with Kazakhstan in 2005 has been resolved by the 50-50 formula, the same formula 
used in solving the Russo-Chinese territorial dispute.289 Overall, depending how high of a potential 
threat Moscow saw in Kazakhstan, the Russian compromise in 1991 is in line with my hypothesis on 
cooperation. Russia emerged from communism in a fragile condition, and it sought good relations 
with Kazakhstan, not only in terms of the border resolution, but in other areas as well. By 2005, given 
the imaginary threat of immigrants and a potential Islamic influence, Russia again cooperated. What 
is interesting, however is that the level of threat from Kazakhstan, especially in 2005, can be ranked 
as rather low, and while Russia compromised according to my expectations, I also have affirmed that 
Russia has not compromised in other cases where the level of threat was higher. 
10.4 Alternative Explanations 
From alternative explanations one can gather that alliances matter. Namely, Russia affirmed 
Kazakh territorial integrity only a few months after Kazakhstan initiated an expansion of the CIS, 
something which Russia welcomed as it realized that security in the area will continue to be under 
Russian control.290 This can also apply to economic interdependence, where we have two countries in 
a close economic relationship (closer than Russia wanted), and such a relationship made cooperation 
easier. Other theories do not apply. However, the case of Kazakhstan firmly refutes some apparent 
observations made in other cases – namely, that Russia would exploit a border issue in order to rally 
domestic support. As Russia has a large Russian minority in the northern Kazakhstan, it could have 
exploited the issue the way it did with Estonia and Latvia, but this has never happened. Thus, the 
claim that states will exploit a territorial issue to rally domestic support now has dubious supporting 
evidence. 
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11 Conclusion 
Dispute Year Value of the Land Strategy Affirmation 
of the 
Hypothesis 
Supported Alternative 
Explanation 
Kuril Islands 
Dispute 
1905 Low Compromise Yes  
 1945 Medium Escalation Yes  
 1955 Medium Compromise Yes  
 1960 High Escalation No Rivalry 
 1978-9 High Escalation No Rivalry 
 1991 Medium Compromise No Norms; Rallying Domestic 
Support 
Sino-Soviet 
Border Dispute 
1964-
1980 
Low Compromise Yes Rivalry 
 1964-
1980 
Low Escalation No Rivalry 
 1986-
1991 
Low Compromise Yes  
 2001 Low Compromise Yes  
 2004 Low Compromise No Theory must be 
expanded; economic 
interdependence 
Estonian-
Russian Border 
1994 Low Escalation Yes  
 1996-
2004 
Low Status-quo No Perverse logic on 
cooperation; norms; 
rivalry 
 2004 Low Escalation No Norms; rivalry 
Latvian-Russian 
Border 
1997 Low Compromise No Perverse logic on 
cooperation; norms 
 2005 Low Escalation No Perverse logic on 
escalation; norms; rivalry 
 2007 Low Compromise No Perverse logic on 
cooperation; norms 
Tuzla Island 2003 Medium Escalation No Rivalry; Rallying Domestic 
Support 
Turkish-Soviet 
Border Dispute 
1921-5 High Compromise Yes  
 1953 High Compromise Yes Rivalry 
Iranian-Soviet 
Border Dispute 
1921-6 High Compromise Yes  
 1954-7 High Compromise Yes Rivalry 
Russo-Kazakh 
Border 
1991 Medium Compromise Yes Alliance; Economic 
Interdependence 
 2004-5 Medium Compromise Yes Alliance; Economic 
Interdependence 
Totals:  Low: 12 
Medium: 6 
High: 6 
Escalation: 8 
Compromise: 
15 
Yes: 13 
No: 11 
Rivalry: 10 
Norms: 6 
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The purpose of this research was to answer the question why there is varied behaviour by 
countries when they deal with their territorial disputes. Two theories have been selected for testing, 
a theory of omnibalancing and a theory of preventive warfare. The former focuses on rationale 
behind compromise, while the latter focuses on coercion/escalation. Overall, the following argument 
was tested. First, the lower the value of land, the more likely that a state will compromise over it, as 
the land with lower value should be easier to give away in return for something else. Second, a state 
is more likely to compromise when it faces a threat (internal or external) to its security (unless this 
coincides with a decline in its own claim strength over the disputed land – in which case 
escalation/coercion is more likely). Third, a state is more likely to escalate/coerce when its relative 
position in a dispute is declining. A state is also more likely to escalate/coerce if it has a weak claim 
already, but suddenly and temporarily receives an opportunity to improve its position. Russia has 
been selected as a case study because it has a rich history of territorial disputes, many of which 
contain more than one strategy out of thee analyzed in this research (cooperative behavior, 
coercive/escalatory behavior, and status-quo preservation). In total, eight different disputes were 
looked at using a wider context (from domestic to international perceptions). The table above 
summarizes phases of each dispute and how those phases ended, as well as whether the outcome of 
each phase is supported by my hypotheses.  
First, it is worth addressing alternative explanations presented in the literature review 
section. As mentioned, Russia re-emerged in 1991 with a quarter of its border unrecognized. Any 
compromise over its territory was seen as risky and had the potential to set off a precedent across 
Russia.291 Even so, Russia has compromised. Despite some evidence that Russia was investing in a 
general reputation for toughness, the question then becomes why Russia cooperated on some cases 
but not on others? If not only to appear tough, is the use of force by Russia also a result of greed or 
insecurity? The timing of Russia’s agreements, public statements by the Russian officials and 
academic analysis explains why and when Russia pursued compromise or escalation. First, the 
explanation that Russia was driven by greed, or that it seized the land in order to exploit its relative 
capabilities holds no water. During numerous territorial disputes, Russia faced a weaker competitor, 
such as Iran after the World War II, yet Russia compromised when it could have done otherwise. 
Second, the democratic peace theory cannot be applied to Russia except during Yeltsin’s rule, when 
Russian behaviour varied from dispute to dispute. 
A slight support exists for the explanation that countries use territorial disputes to rally the 
domestic support. Yeltsin, if one is to assume that he was bluffing in negotiations with Japan, in 1991 
sought cooperation (as Russia emerged weakened after the Soviet collapse), but fell short of 
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compromise in order to appease potent nationalist forces at home which were seeking to oust him 
from power. Also in response to Estonia, Yeltsin publicly stated that he will not give an inch of 
Russia’s land, again a move to appease the domestic opposition. Putin also utilized a territorial 
dispute to rally the domestic support just before the Presidential elections of 2004, whereby Russia 
attempted to coerce Ukraine over the Tuzla Island dispute.  
Similarly, slight evidence exists for theories on economic interdependence. Putin in 2004 
compromised to China by giving away most of the remaining disputed territory, not because Russia 
faced a threat, but because Russia had a good economic relationship with China, which it wanted to 
continue. Compromise was a way of strengthening that relationship. Slight evidence also exists for a 
theory on cooperation among allies. In particular, this can apply to the Russian willingness to reward 
Kazakhstan for its commitment to the expansion of the CIS. Overall, the evidence on these 
alternative explanations appears to explain a few deviant cases, but in many other cases alternative 
explanations occur in congruence with the hypotheses of this research. 
More frequent support is found with the rivalry theory, namely in ten out of twenty-four 
cases. It applies to the case of Khruschev’s coercion of Japan in 1960 in response to Japanese-
American cooperation, as well as Khrushchev’s coercion in 1970 in response to the Sino-Japanese 
cooperation (when China at the time was improving its relationship with the US). Rivalry also played 
an important role for Russia’s calculations in solving its territorial dispute with China, the Baltic States 
and Ukraine. Yet even though rivalry is an alternative explanation, in some cases it complements my 
hypothesis that countries facing a threat will cooperate. One can see this in the case of Iran and 
Turkey, where a rivalry was the external threat which led the Soviet Union to compromise. In such a 
way, the approach presented here and the rivalry approach can sometimes complement each other. 
However, even though rivalry is sometimes the main driving force behind a particular strategy, I have 
also discovered that rivals tend to change their strategies, as Soviet Union did towards China. 
Alternative explanations focusing on the role of norms also have a more frequent support, 
with six cases showing strong supportive evidence. This evidence comes from Yeltsin’s cooperation 
with Japan in 1991, despite the discovery of evidence that Japan had the legal claim over the islands. 
He chose to cooperate because he had already established norms of cooperation just a few months 
earlier. In the case of Russia’s dispute with the Baltic States, Russia utilized norms to stall any border 
agreement, by calling into question the treatment of Russian minorities and the historical role of the 
Soviet Union. However, by observing the table above one can see that these explanations of norms 
have never occurred in isolation as the only explanation. The only way norms can have significance is 
when they occur with other factors, but never alone. 
Despite alternative theories receiving some support, my hypotheses based on the theory of 
omnibalancing and the theory of preventive warfare receive the most support, namely, in 13 out of 
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24 cases there is supportive evidence. In some cases my hypotheses are the only explanation, as is 
visible in the case of the Sino-Soviet border dispute in 1991, when the Soviet Union sought to gain 
international support (and limit expenses on border forces) as it was in the midst of collapse. Many 
other cases, however, show support of my hypotheses together with alternative explanations, such 
as the case of Russo-Kazakh border, where Russia compromised both because of the internal threats 
it faced but also because Kazakhstan was very supportive of Russia, thereby reflecting importance of 
alliances. Only in eight cases it appears that my hypotheses are the only explanation supported by 
evidence, which is exactly one third of all cases. 
It seems that whenever the logic of my theoretical approach fails, namely, when states 
choose to escalate or they suddenly fail to cooperate, as was the case with the Kuril Islands and 
Estonia, one can claim that the USSR/Russia had nothing to gain from cooperation. After all, Fravel 
states that the scope of the theory for cooperation cannot include states which have nothing to 
offer. Perhaps Japan and Estonia had nothing to offer in return for the stable border, and indeed it 
seems unlikely that either one of them would sacrifice their alliance with the Americans for the land 
of low/medium value. Perhaps, if the land was more valuable, Russia could have offered a better 
deal. However, the Soviet/Russian behaviour is not consistent enough to confirm that countries 
drifting into rival’s sphere of influence have nothing to offer. The reason is that the Soviet 
compromises to Turkey and Iran demonstrate the Soviet cooperation as they also drifted into the 
Western camp. In the first instance, therefore, the USSR/Russia was uncompromising, which does 
not fit my theoretical approach, but in the case of Turkey and Iran, Soviet/Russian actions fit the logic 
of the theory. Therefore, whenever the Soviet/Russian leaders changed their strategy in regards to a 
particular dispute, it was not always in consistency with the theory, even when cases seem to fall 
within the scope defined by Fravel. Variation of Russia’s behaviour then reflects multiple theories, 
but again, my theoretical approach holds the strongest explanatory power. 
The case of the Baltic States is one which least fits my theoretical approach, and while it 
undermines my hypotheses, certain provisions can be made why this is so. As I discovered, the Baltic 
States were pushed to engage Russia by the European Union, which in order to grant membership to 
the Baltic States, demanded resolution of all border disputes. This has pushed the Baltic States to 
seek compromise with Russia, without Russia having to sacrifice anything on its part. In fact, one can 
see that Russia has utilized the Baltic States’ desire for border resolution to address other bilateral 
issues, as well as other geopolitical concerns, such as the NATO expansion. One can then note that 
the case of Baltic States presents a lot of perverse logic. For example, Russia desired to cooperate not 
by conceding territory, but simply by signing a border agreement. Evidently, Yeltsin’s statements 
show that he was not willing to give an inch of the Russian territory while the war in Chechnya 
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progressed. As such, the most evident conclusion from the dispute with the Baltic States is that 
Russia always linked the dispute to other issues: norms (the issue of Russian minority) and rivalry 
(preventing the EU and NATO expansion). Similar conclusion also follows from the dispute over the 
Tuzla Island, where the issue is not so much sovereignty over the island, but other issues in Russo-
Ukrainian bilateral relationship. 
 Three changes must be made to the theory of omnibalancing and the theory of preventive 
warfare in order to make them more suitable to the case of Russia. First, one needs to address 
bluffing. Every political leadership sometimes tends to bluff, as Yeltsin might have, and therefore a 
certain element of uncertainty will always exist, which is also the reason why Yeltsin’s actions have 
been portrayed here as both cooperative and bluffing. Second, I have discovered cases of 
simultaneous escalation and cooperation, as Russia has used this strategy against China from 1964 
until the late 1970s. Namely, Russia offered to cooperate, as is predicted by my theoretical 
framework, but it also sought to punish Chinese non-cooperation. In such a way, strategies of 
cooperation and escalation are not mutually exclusive, as Fravel has applied them, but rather they 
can complement each other to adopt a tougher bargaining position. Third, cooperation between 
Russia and China over the last remaining few islands in 2004 can only be explained by Putin’s desire 
to compensate China (since he built the oil pipeline to Japan instead of China). This means that the 
theory of omnibalancing must include cooperation, not only to deal with threats, but rather any issue 
that can be part of a bargaining process (for example, sharing of resources, protection of ethnic 
minorities, and even historical arguments). Adding this premise to the theory would strengthen its 
explanatory power in the few cases which cannot be confirmed by the hypotheses. 
 Apart from the results based on the theory of omnibalancing and the theory of preventive 
warfare, the first hypothesis receives no support. In other words, results show that Russia is not 
more likely to threaten or use force over more valuable land, while compromising over less valuable 
land. What my research has discovered is quite an even mixture of strategies in each dispute, 
regardless the value of the territory. For instance, data in the above table shows almost identical 
ratio of instances of ‘cooperation to escalation’ among low value land and high value land cases. Low 
value territories experienced 7 instances of cooperation to 4 instances of escalation, while high value 
territories experienced 4 instances of cooperation to 2 instances of escalation. The rationale behind 
this finding is simple. The intrinsic value of a territory does not change frequently, but its relative 
value does. Think of the case of Kuril Islands. Its physical territory has not changed much in past few 
hundred years. However, due to the ideological clash between the USSR and the US, Sea of Okhotsk 
became of extreme importance for the Soviets to be able to target US cities in a nuclear strike. For 
this reason, the Kuril Islands suddenly experienced high relative value. Yet the relative value can also 
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drop very fast, as it did for Kuril Islands as soon as the Soviets developed technology to move their 
submarines to the Barents Sea. Rapid advancements in technological development, regime changes, 
and relations among states make the relative value of any territory prone to high fluctuations. 
 In the introduction, I mentioned that there are some indirect contributions of this research. 
First, I have hoped to establish an understanding as to what a conducive international environment 
for resolving territorial disputes might look like. It appears that a state (if one is to generalize beyond 
Russia and China) will seek to cooperate when it feels two conditions a) it is facing an issue that can 
be bargained over; b) it believes that the opponent can offer something in return for the land. 
Second, this research has also established that any forceful seizure of land will likely see an 
escalation in conflict because territory is too valuable of a bargaining issue to be given up. In all cases 
of forceful seizure in this study, the result has been years of non-cooperation and even tension, if not 
outright retaliation. Third, this research has discovered that distinct categories of 
cooperation/escalation/status-quo are problematic in research of this type as sometimes states 
apply different strategies at the same time. Fourth, practitioners in the fields of international 
relations, politics, diplomacy and international business can now understand that the biggest risks 
coming from any territorial dispute are sudden changes in claim strength of either/both disputant(s), 
or a deteriorating bilateral relationship. Deteriorating bilateral relationship usually makes disputed 
land a more valuable bargaining item, making cooperation less likely. The biggest opportunities to 
cooperate occur when the opponent has something of value to offer in return for the territory. Fifth, 
I have now finally gathered an answer to the question whether Russia is more of an aggressive or a 
cooperative player. Evidence points towards a more cooperative approach. Namely, Russia has 
escalated in only 1/3 of its territorial disputes, despite having the second most powerful military in 
the world. This would be a surprise to those who might believe that Russia still has imperialist 
ambitions. 
Unfortunately, the conclusion of this research is not very strong, as 46% of the cases here 
face stronger evidence for competing or alternative explanations. In fact, this means that Fravel in his 
study on China was too ambitious by stating that his results apply globally. Further research should 
thus seek to reframe the theory following some of my suggestions as they help to incorporate non-
confirmative cases in Russia, and then test the reframed theory with additional evidence. Also, few 
more cases can be added to territorial disputes of Russia, namely, the maritime disputes and 
unconventional territorial disputes (such as the Russo-Georgian conflict over Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia). There is no reason to believe that maritime disputes or disputes over unconventional 
territory should follow an entirely different logic. Maritime areas, as well as territories such as 
protectorate states, also have certain value and countries can use them to trade for certain 
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concessions. Finally, further research should especially focus on testing this theoretical framework 
beyond Russia. Since this theory has so far been tested on China, and now on Russia, it would be 
interesting how the theory fares with less similar states. This will help answer questions such as does 
this theoretical framework only apply to states similar to Russia and China (such as non-democratic 
great powers)? Or can this framework apply globally to less similar countries, such as the Costa Rica? 
In a way, this last point shows limitations of this research. First, one cannot yet make these 
findings generalizable to all countries. This is especially so because the theoretical framework 
selected here does not have as strong support in Russia as it does in case of China. Second, I had to 
make an intelligent choice on many facts and arguments which are historically disputed. Certainly 
historians may change the validity of many of these facts and arguments, but for now, I accepted the 
most plausible evidence. Finally, many alternative explanations were looked at, but their role is not 
very clear, since they sometimes appear in support of my hypotheses, and at other times they appear 
independently. Further research should delineate and clarify the relationship between this 
theoretical framework and alternative explanations. 
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